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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Scotland currently operates a fault-based compensation scheme for 
medical negligence claims, meaning that compensation is predicated on 
showing that the health provider was negligent. The current scheme is funded 
by NHSScotland, with Health Boards protected against disproportionate loss 
by the Clinical Negligence and Other Risks Indemnity Scheme (CNORIS), 
which was implemented in 2000. Crown indemnity was introduced in Scotland 
in 1989. Thereafter the liability for medical negligence claims has been 
handled on behalf of the NHS Health Boards, by the Central Legal Office 
(CLO). 
 
1.2  The establishment of the No-Fault Compensation Review Working 
Group was announced on the 1st June 2009, with the remit to consider the 
potential benefits of implementing a ‘no-fault’ scheme for medical negligence 
claims in Scotland alongside the existing arrangements. This report follows 
from research commissioned in order to inform the Working Group’s review. 
The research has been conducted in three parts: 
 
1. A comparative literature review of existing no-fault schemes 
 (including new Zealand, Finland, Sweden and Denmark): Farrell, A-M., 
Devaney, S., and Dar, M. (2010) No-Fault Compensation Schemes for 
Medical Injury: A Review. Edinburgh: Scottish Government published in 
Volume II of the Working Group’s Report and available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Health/NHS-Scotland/No-
faultCompensation.    
 
2. An empirical study of the views of key stakeholders and pursuers 
concerning the implications of a no-fault scheme, as well as a study of 
closed medical negligence claims under the present system 
 
and following the Working Group’s recommendations 
 
3. Estimating the potential operating costs of the proposed no-fault system 
based on CLO data. 
  
1.3  The need to consider the potential benefit of a no-fault scheme in 
Scotland arises from concern about a number of problems with the current 
system of resolving medical negligence claims in the UK. These include 
issues with claimants not pursuing a complaint or a claim, claims being 
delayed, claimants experiencing difficulties in funding claims, and expense of 
experts (NAO 2001, Symon 2000, Fenn et al. 2000). The number of adverse 
events and the number of claims paid out in Scotland are both low relative to 
the rest of the UK and other jurisdictions; nevertheless there have been 
suggestions that adverse events have been increasing in recent years (Aiken 
et al. 2001), as have claim costs (Symon 1999).  
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1.4 Fault-based schemes focus solely on the need to prove negligence, and 
it has been argued that this focus does little to improve the quality of care, 
produces defensive medical practices, discourages error reporting and 
institutional learning, and blocks transparency. It has been argued that no-
fault schemes, which remove the requirement to show negligence, address 
many of these problems (Studdert and Brennan 2001). 
 
Aims and objectives of the research 
 
1.5 The research for this report provides an empirical analysis of the 
potential implications of implementing a no-fault scheme. The research 
consisted of four components, and the aims of each component were as 
follows: 
 
1. Examine the views of key stakeholders on the impact of a no-fault 
scheme on: the generation of claims and their prevention (i.e. 
deterrence); impact on medical practice; sources and extent of delays 
in compensation; use of experts and lawyers in the system; cost 
drivers; and barriers to developing a learning culture.  
 
2. Examine the views of pursuers concerning their: motivations for 
claiming; nature and impact of the injury; use of complaints procedures; 
sources of delay; relationship with and role of lawyers; access to 
interim payment; access to ongoing care and support; satisfaction with 
the process and outcome of the claim.  
 
3. Analyse data provided by the CLO concerning closed files, focusing on: 
claims outcomes (payment of compensation; number of claims settled, 
withdrawn or repudiated); length of time to reach resolution; legal 
costs; and impact of solicitor specialisation.  
 
4. Following, the Working Group’s report provide estimates of the costs (as 
measured by the public expenditure implications) of implementing the 
Working Group’s preferred No-Fault Scheme (NFS) based on plausible 
assumptions. 
 
 
Methods 
 
1.6 This report presents the first empirical data on medical negligence 
claiming in Scotland, and is the first attempt to triangulate data from pursuers, 
other stakeholders and claims in any jurisdiction. The project drew on three 
sources of data: 
 
1.7 First, we conducted 30 in-depth interviews with pursuers. There is only 
one previous study in the UK that involved pursuers, and this used a 
questionnaire to examine the motivations of claimants in England (Vincent et 
al. 1994). Other research that has directly involved claimants has been 
conducted in the US, and has also used questionnaires to examine motives 
(Hickson et al. 1992, May and Stengel 1990, Huycke and Huycke 1994). In 
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contrast, our research used qualitative methods to examine pursuers’ 
perceptions and experiences of the entire claiming process. For pursuers, an 
optimal system would provide for appropriate compensation, timely resolution 
of claims, and access to ongoing care, support and rehabilitation as needed. It 
is also important to understand why pursuers commence a claim, including 
their perceptions of what had gone wrong, experiences of the complaints 
process, motivations for making a claim, and satisfaction with outcomes, in 
order to appreciate that potential impact of a no-fault scheme. It is not 
possible to fully understand each of these aspects of claiming without directly 
speaking to pursuers themselves. The need to take a sensitive approach and 
to obtain in-depth data guided the decision to conduct interviews. 
 
1.8 Second, interviews and focus groups were used to examine the views of 
42 other stakeholders. These included pursuer solicitors, representatives from 
defender groups, patient support and advice groups, representatives of 
medical practitioner interests groups, and Independent Advice and Support 
Service (IASS) advisors. Participants from within the NHS included people 
directly involved in dealing with complaints, patient liaison, legal services and 
financial managers, as well as a spread of medical practitioners. These 
included practitioners from midwifery, general surgery, accident and 
emergency, obstetrics, and critical care. 
 
1.9 Third, we conducted an analysis of data provided by the Central Legal 
Office (CLO) concerning claims closed since 1989. This data allows for a 
more generalised view of medical negligence claims than that provided by the 
more qualitative aspects of our research.  
 
1.10 Following the Working Group’s recommendations we then used the CLO 
data to estimate what the public expenditure implications would have been of 
the preferred NFS had it been in place in a typical year. 
 
Key findings 
 
1.10 While the focus of the research was on the intimation of a medical 
negligence claim as the end point of a process. The starting point of this the 
process for pursuers consisted of an adverse event taking place, or a patient 
perceiving that an adverse event has occurred. Most pursuers also had 
attempted to make a complaint prior to seeking legal advice and many of the 
findings reported here relate to events leading up to the claims process. It is 
likely that changes to any of the earlier stages of this process will change 
eventual claiming behaviour 
 
Adverse events 
 
 The rate of adverse events was seen by some pursuers to be related to 
the level of resourcing. For example it was felt that errors occurred if 
decisions were influenced by resourcing issues rather than medical 
needs. 
 The reduction of adverse events requires tracking of errors and 
systematic learning 
  4 
 NHS staff mostly appeared satisfied that a system of reporting was in 
place which ensured lessons were being learnt.  However, staff identified 
a number of problems that persist and barriers to reporting of errors.  
 There was little support from NHS-based stakeholders for the 
implementation of compulsory reporting in Scotland. They felt that that 
continuing cultural change would alleviate problems rather than stricter 
regulation.  
 Whilst there appeared to be mechanisms for institutional learning from 
errors within individual clinical teams, there was less opportunity for 
institutional learning across Health Boards. 
 
Patient grievances 
 
 Experiencing an adverse event does not necessarily result in making a 
claim.  
 Pursuers described an accumulation of problems which led to an overall 
sense of being disempowered. 
 Pursuers’ grievances included aspects of medical care, general care, not 
feeling fully informed, not including family members in the consent 
process and resourcing problems  
 Communication breakdown was also identified by stakeholders as the 
main reasons behind patient dissatisfaction.  
 
Complaints 
 
 NHSScotland provides a single route for making a complaint against any 
NHS service. The complaints process is intended to provide an 
investigation, explanation, and where appropriate, an apology. It does 
not provide financial compensation.  
 Most pursuers appeared knowledgeable about the complaints 
procedure, and most had used it. The main source of dissatisfaction 
related to feeling as if the explanation was not sufficient.  
 The complaints procedures appears to have a heavy reliance on written 
material and communication, and NHS staff reported that the 
increasingly complex nature of complaints made achieving the 20 day 
limit on replying difficult. Nevertheless, NHS staff felt that most 
complaints are resolved at a local level. 
 Many complaints concerned communication problems, which are not 
necessarily recorded in medical records, and the complaints system is 
not geared towards recognising these issues.  
 The main problem with the complaints procedures appears to be 
patient’s reluctance to use the process, largely due to fear of damaging 
the relationship with the healthcare provider. Patients may also be too 
ill or feel too vulnerable to make a complaint, and support from family 
and friends, and support and advice groups, was important in 
overcoming the power imbalance between patients and the NHS. It 
was apparent that patients need support to make a complaint, however 
advice was not always readily available or they were unaware of how 
to access advice. 
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Medical negligence claims 
 
1.11 Problems with the current scheme included: 
 
 Complaints and legal claims cannot be run at the same time in Scotland, 
which can potentially lead to considerable delay in resolving a claim; 
 Previous research suggests that there is a problem of underclaiming in 
Scotland, where people with a potential medical negligence claim do 
not pursue their legal entitlements. Patients may not sue if they do not 
know an error has occurred, they are unable to access legal 
representation, or are afraid of retribution; 
 The need to prove negligence is a significant barrier to obtaining 
compensation; 
 Sources of funding for claims are limited, and there are also very few 
specialised solicitors; 
 Pursuers’ primary motivation was the desire for validation of their 
explanation of what had gone wrong. Pursuers rarely received this 
validation from either the complaints process or from pursuing a claim; 
 Pursuers also wanted to protect other patients from a similar experience. 
Few wanted an apology. Most pursuers claimed that financial 
compensation was not a main motivation for suing, although medical 
professionals tended to believe that the desire for finanical 
compensation was pursuers’ only motivation;    
 Pursuers who did not win generally felt that these motivations were not 
fulfilled, and some pursuers who received compensation continued to be 
dissatisfied; 
 The failure to implement case management reforms, including setting 
time limits by which parties needed to produce responses and progress 
claims, and ensuring the exchange of expert reports, was identified as 
hampering the progression of claims.  
 
1.12 Our analysis of the data on closed cases provided by the Central Legal 
Office suggests that: 
 
 Settlement is more likely to result when the pursuer is represented by a 
firm experienced in medical negligence claiming and the larger the 
financial ‘value’ of the claim 
 Many ‘small value’ claims are not settled 
 The costs of settled claims with an award below £20,000 now, on 
average, exceed the value of the award; 
 There are also significant costs to the public purse of unsettled claims 
 
1.13 Our views of the potential impact of a new scheme are that: 
 
 A no-fault scheme will not automatically decrease medical errors, as this 
also requires errors to be reported and lessons learnt;  
  6 
 Improving patient communication, empowering patients to make 
informed decisions and improving standards of care are important for 
decreasing claims; 
 A no-fault scheme will need to be accompanied by an education 
campaign; 
 A no-fault scheme would benefit from providing multiple routes of 
access. Potential pursuers will need to be informed of any new 
scheme, and advice and support groups will need to be tied into the 
process.  
 A no-fault scheme will need to sit alongside the existing complaints 
procedure, which already aims to provide explanations and apologies; 
 A new scheme would also require a screening and investigation process 
to identify claims where a clinical error has occurred, although pursuers 
would still want problems to be acknowledged, and possibly, to receive 
compensation; 
 A scheme linking small financial payments to the complaints system 
might remove a significant number of small claims from the legal system 
and reduce the cost of settling them. 
 
Conclusions 
 
1.14 Suing a medical professional is the final step in a process that 
commences with the patient having a grievance. Grievances, complaints and 
even claims, were not necessarily related to a specific clinical event. Instead, 
patients’ grievances were tied to problems of communication breakdown, staff 
attitude, perceptions of inadequate resourcing, and poor general care. Much 
of the discussion arising from the qualitative data has focussed on improving 
the complaints procedure in order to give complainants a greater sense that 
they were being listened to and that steps would be taken to ensure 
individuals and institutions learned from their complaint.  
 
1.15 Our interviews with pursuers suggest that their major motivation is to 
gain recognition for their narrative around a medical ‘error’, and generally 
these narratives involved a number of complex and overlapping grievances. In 
their view, negligence had occurred, even if their claim was withdrawn. This 
suggests that much needs to be done to make clear the distinction between 
causation and liability. Interviews with other stakeholders suggest a view that 
a ‘no-fault’ system might open the ‘floodgates’. Others with direct experience 
of claims suggest that the current delict system meant that pursuers’ solicitors 
were able to mediate the process through shaping pursuers’ expectations and 
screening out unmeritorious claims. There seems to be little if any support for 
capping any new scheme. 
 
1.16 Our quantitative analysis has demonstrated that settlement of a claim is 
influenced by a range of factors including the level of experience of pursuer’s 
solicitors in dealing with such claims and the financial value of the claim. 
Relatively small value claims appear less likely to result in settlement. We 
suggest that small claims might be better dealt with in a development of the 
complaints system which permitted a moderate level of financial payment in 
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some claims.  The data available to us suggests that there are considerable 
costs involved currently in settling small claims. 
 
1.17 The Working Group has proposed the setting up of a ‘No-Fault’ Scheme 
for medical injury.  In the Appendix to this Report we provide upper and lower 
estimates for the cost of such a scheme in a typical year over the recent past.  
We also provide a base-line estimate of the current negligence scheme’s 
costs for a typical year of £18,057,455.  Based on a range of plausible 
assumptions we estimate an upper estimate of £27,014,275 and a lower 
estimate is £18,357,455. The proportionate increase in public expenditure 
represented by our upper estimate is considerably lower than that previously 
estimated for the introduction of a no-fault scheme in England (Fenn et al 
2004). 
 
1.18 It is important to note that estimates produced are not predictions of 
what a no-fault scheme will cost in the future but are estimates of what public 
expenditure would have been in a typical year over the recent past for cases 
handled by the Central Legal Office had the proposed no-fault scheme been 
in existence.   
 
1.19 The Review Group’s Recommendation 5 is that “any compensation 
awarded should be based on need rather than on a tariff based system”.   We 
understand that under the current system a large proportion of legal claims 
are settled out of court.  No allowances are built into the estimated figures to 
reflect this as it has been assumed that payments under a no-fault scheme 
based on the Group’s recommendation would be of the same magnitude as 
successful claims under the current litigation system.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The current system of medical negligence compensation in Scotland 
 
2.1 Scotland currently operates a fault-based compensation scheme for 
medical negligence claims, meaning that compensation is predicated on 
showing that the health provider was negligent. Compensation can either be 
awarded by the court, or be paid to the pursuer in the form of an out of court 
settlement following a claim against an NHS Board.  
 
2.2 The current system covers medical negligence claims made directly 
against employed Health Board staff, which includes medical, dental and 
nursing staff. It also covers all aspects of hospital care, as well as front-line 
and support activities. Pursuers can seek compensation in relation to injuries 
or loss, including delays in treatment, future care loss, and loss of earnings. 
Health Boards fund all settlements, but are protected against disproportionate 
loss by the Clinical Negligence and Other Risks Indemnity Scheme 
(CNORIS).  It does not cover claims made against GPs and other primary 
care contractors, such as dentists, optometrists or pharmacists, and claims 
made against these providers are separately insured.  
 
2.3 CNORIS was implemented on the 1st April, 2000 and membership is 
mandatory for all health boards. The two principle aims of the scheme are: 
first, to provide financial efficiency through cost-effective risk pool and claims 
management; second, effective risk management strategies. Willis Ltd has 
been contracted to design, implement and manage the CNORIS scheme.  
Crown indemnity was introduced in Scotland in 1989. Thereafter the liability 
for medical negligence claims has been handled on behalf of the Health 
Boards, by the Central Legal Office (CLO). 
 
2.4 The Scottish scheme is distinct from the current schemes operating in 
England and Wales. In England, medical negligence claims against the NHS 
are the responsibility of the NHS Litigation Authority (NHSLA). The NHLSA 
was established in 1995, and the liability for medical negligence claims (which 
have occurred on or after 1st April, 1995) are covered by the Clinical 
Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST). In Wales2, the Welsh Risk Pool 
(WRP) is a mutual self-insurance scheme designed to cover member NHS 
bodies in Wales. WRP membership is voluntary, although every Trust and 
Local Health Board in Wales is currently a member. Members paid a premium 
into a pool, with premiums based upon the size and claims history of the 
organisation.  
 
2.5 All of the current British schemes are fault-based, although in England 
the NHS Redress Act (2006) has set out a framework for establishing the 
NHS Redress Scheme, although the Act is yet to be fully implemented. The 
Scheme is intended to provide a swift resolution of low monetary value claims 
                                               
2 The National Assembly for Wales passed new legislation, entitled the National Health 
Service (Concerns, Complaints and Redress Arrangements) (Wales) Regulations 2011, which 
became law in April this year.   
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(£20,000 limit) without the need to go to court. NHS bodies in England would 
determine liability of claims and make payments.  
 
2.6 To date, there has been no comprehensive review of ways in which the 
different British schemes operate. The Scottish scheme has some distinct 
features, which are likely to make its operation significantly different than the 
other British jurisdictions. There are fewer claims in Scotland compared to 
England, Scotland has fewer specialised pursuer solicitors, and there are 
important procedural differences between Scotland and the other British 
jurisdictions. The implications of these differences are examined throughout 
the report.  
 
The argument for reform 
 
2.7 The No-Fault Compensation Review Working Group was established on 
the 1st June 2009 in order to consider the potential benefits of a ‘no-fault’ 
scheme in Scotland, and whether such a scheme could be introduced 
alongside the existing clinical arrangements. No-fault schemes are seen as 
the main alternatives to fault-based schemes, and no-fault schemes do not 
require the pursuer to prove negligence.  
 
2.8 An optimal system for resolving medical negligence claims must deal 
efficiently with claims and minimise costs. For pursuers, an optimal system 
provides for appropriate compensation, timely resolution of claims, and 
access to ongoing care, support and rehabilitation as needed. For scheme 
providers and their members, costs of claims need to be contained, and while 
savings can be made by minimising costs associated with litigation, such as 
excessive legal fees and expert reports, the most significant cost driver is the 
number and extent of claims. Potential problems identified in the current 
system of resolving medical negligence claims in the UK include issues with 
claimants not making a complaint or claim, claims being delayed, claimants 
experiencing difficulties in funding claims, and expense of experts (NAO 2001, 
Symon 2000, Fenn et al. 2000). 
 
2.9 The primary goal for an optimal medical negligence scheme should be to 
prevent errors from occurring in the first place. The number of adverse events 
and claims paid out in Scotland are low relative to the rest of the UK and other 
jurisdictions.  There have been suggestions that adverse events and claim 
costs have been increasing in recent years (Aiken et al. 2001, Ross et al. 
2000), Symon 1999).  
 
2.10 Fault-based schemes focus solely on the need to prove negligence. It 
has been argued that this does little to improve the quality of care, produces 
defensive medical practices, discourages error reporting and institutional 
learning, and blocks transparency. It has been argued that no-fault schemes 
address many of these faults (Studdert and Brennan 2001). 
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Aims and objectives of the research 
 
2.11 Our research was commissioned in order to inform the Working Group’s 
review. The research has been conducted in three parts: 
 
1.  A comparative literature review of the existing no-fault schemes 
(including New Zealand, Finland, Sweden and Denmark): Farrell, A-M., 
Devaney, S., and Dar, M. (2010) No-Fault Compensation Schemes for 
Medical Injury: A Review. Edinburgh: Scottish Government published as 
Volume II of the Working Group’s Report; 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Health/NHS-Scotland/No-
faultCompensation.     
 
1. An empirical study of the views of key stakeholders and pursuers 
concerning the implications of a no-fault scheme, and the analysis of 
closed medical negligence claims under the present system. The 
findings of this research are presented in Chapter 3 of this report; 
 
2. Estimates of the potential costs in a typical year over the recent past of 
operating the NFS proposed by the Working Group based on CLO data 
which are presented in the Appendix to this report.  
 
Research history on medical negligence 
 
2.12 Our research is the first systematic study of medical negligence claiming 
in Scotland, and is the first attempt to triangulate data from pursuers, other 
stakeholders and claims.   There is a large body of work that has examined 
different medical negligence schemes.  This literature is summarised by 
Farrell et al (2010). However, there is very little work on the views of actual 
stakeholders who are impacted by medical negligence and the subsequent 
claims. 
 
2.13 Most studies have collected the views of pursuers and have been 
conducted in the US (Hickson et al. 1992, May and Stengel 1990, Huycke and 
Huycke 1994). In the UK, the only work directly involving claimants has been 
conducted by Charles Vincent, who examined motivations for suing (Vincent 
et al. 1994).  Since this study substantial changes have occurred in the way in 
which the NHS deals with complaints and the role of risk management within 
the medical profession. Most other research in the UK has focused on 
patients who have made a complaint, rather than those who have pursued a 
legal claim (e.g. Mulcahy et al. 1996, Mulcahy and Tritter 1998). 
 
2.14 There has been no previous examination of the experiences of medical 
negligence pursuers in Scotland. The Expert Group on Financial and Other 
Support (Ross, 2003) reported on the provision of compensation for Scottish 
patients infected with HCV or HIV from blood treatment. It relied on 
submissions, rather than systematically contacting stakeholders and pursuers. 
They noted that a no-fault scheme may offer the advantages of early 
resolution, reduction of legal costs and decreasing stress on pursuers and 
defendants alike. However, it also expressed concern that a no-fault scheme 
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may not necessarily offer accountability or increase the quality of care. 
Although consideration of a no-fault scheme was outside its remit, it did 
identify a number of issues. First, it suggested that medical causation rather 
than negligence (as under the New Zealand and Swedish) schemes be used 
as the basis for compensation. Second, it warned that a no-fault scheme 
would cost substantially more than the existing scheme. Third, a no-fault 
scheme would not establish deterrence or accountability. While the Expert 
Group also found support for placing the onus of proof on the NHS rather than 
pursuer, they did not go so far as to recommend this change.  
 
2.15 In Scotland, as in other jurisdictions, researchers have primarily focused 
on the nature of complaints, patients’ experiences of the complaints 
procedures, and barriers to raising a complaint or a concern. These studies 
include Annandale and Hunt’s (1998) survey of patients, which focused on 
reasons for concern and actions taken. The most recent work into patient’s 
complaints consists of the Scottish Health Council’s (2009) report which 
mapped complaint mechanisms and involved a survey of patients as well as 
focus groups, and examined reasons for complaints, actions taken, 
experiences of complaining, and use of support agencies. Other studies in 
Scotland have also investigated actions taken by people with a potential legal 
problem (Genn and Paterson 2001, Pleasence et al. 2003, Pleasence et al. 
2006). 
 
2.16 While there is little research on the experiences and perceptions of 
pursuers, there is a large body of research that has looked at how litigation or 
the threat of litigation affects the behaviour of medical practitioners. For the 
most part, this work has examined the rise of defensive medicine as a 
reaction to doctor’s anxiety about the threat of litigation (Tancredi and 
Barondess (1978), Bishop et al. 2010, Charles et al. 1985, Elmore et al. 2005, 
Katz et al. 2005, Kressler et al. 1988, Rodriguez et al. 2007, Sloan et al. 1989, 
Studdert et al. 2005, Weisman et al. 1989, Woodward and Rosser 1989, 
Zuckerman 1984). Fear of litigation has also been shown to deter doctors 
from disclosing medical errors (Berlin 1997, Chan et al. 2005, Gallagher et al. 
2003). In the US doctors’ concern about the impact of litigation on insurance 
premiums is a significant factor in producing defensive medicine (Studdert et 
al. 2005). Defensive medical practice, as a result of concern about complaints 
or litigation, also occurs in the UK (Passmore and Leung 2002).  
 
2.17 Such studies have largely relied on surveys of doctors’ self-reported 
behaviour.  Research that utilises clinical scenarios suggests defensive 
medical behaviour is exaggerated (Klingman et al. 1996, Glassman et al. 
1996).  Fear of litigation appears to have the same effect on behaviour as 
actually being sued (Charles et al. 1985, Weisman et al. 1989, Elmore et al. 
2005) and doctors exaggerate the risk of facing a malpractice claim 
(Annandale and Cunningham-Burley 1996, Ennis and Vincent et al.1994, 
Lawthers et al. 1992). 
 
2.18 Interviews with doctors who have gone through medical malpractice 
litigation show that doctors struggle with feelings of anger, betrayal, shame, 
humiliation, isolation and loss of confidence. Doctors who have been sued 
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reported symptoms of stress-related illness and very few had talked to anyone 
about their experiences or sought any other form of support. Doctors also 
reported that being sued had undermined their relationship with patients, and 
that their satisfaction with their career had decreased (Charles et al. 1984, 
1985, 1988, Martin et al. 1991, Saberi et al. 2009, Shapiro et al. 1989, Ennis 
and Grudzinskas 1993, Ennis and Vincent 1994, Rosenblatt et al. 1990). 
Similar results have also been reported in New Zealand following a medical 
complaint, rather than a legal claim (Cunningham 2004a). Complaints have 
also been shown to result in defensive medical practices (Cunningham and 
Dovey 2006).  
 
2.19 Finally, there is a large body of work that has investigated the outcomes, 
process of negotiation and trends in medical negligence claiming through 
analysis of closed files. Most of this work has been conducted in the US, and 
has used insurance company records (Danzon 1982, 1990), regulator 
databases (Black 2005, Vidmar 2005 et al.) and jury verdicts (Bovbjerg and 
Bartow 2003:3, Chandra et al. 2005). Studies have also drawn on claimants’ 
medical files in order to predict incidence rates of adverse events, as well as 
analysing the types of events which activate claims (Brennan et al. 1991, 
1996, Jost et al. 1993, Bismark et al. 2006, Dunn et al. 2006). Research in the 
UK has generally followed the American approach, focusing on estimating 
frequencies of adverse events and reporting claim costs (Ham et al. 1988, 
Fenn 2002, Fenn et al. 2000, 2004, Vincent et al. 1994, 2001). These studies 
have not attempted to examine the Scottish situation separately, with its 
separate NHS and legal systems. 
 
Research methods 
 
2.20 Our research on the current system involved three components: 
 
1. Interviews with 30 pursuers 
 
2. interviews and/or focus group with 42 other key stakeholders 
 
3. Analysis of claims data provided by the CLO concerning files closed 
since the introduction of Crown indemnity in 1989. 
 
2.21 We conducted 30 interviews with pursuers, accessed via solicitors who 
specialise in medical negligence claims. Our sample does not represent a 
cross-section of people who have potentially experienced a clinical injury, as 
we only spoke to people who pursued a legal claim. By ‘legal claim’, we refer 
to the intimation of a claim, which involves an investigation in order to 
ascertain whether negligence occurred. Often claims do not continue past this 
initial investigation, especially if a medical expert is not supportive. We have 
no direct evidence on why a patient may not pursue a complaint or a claim 
after suffering an adverse event, why some aggrieved patients complain but 
not others, or why a patient who has complained decides not to continue with 
a legal claim. 
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2.22 Our recruitment method also meant that we were unable to speak to 
pursuers who did not use a specialised solicitor. This could be an important 
issue in Scotland, as there are only six accredited pursuer specialists, all 
located in either Edinburgh or Glasgow. However, see our analysis of the 
CLO data, reported in Chapter 3.  
 
2.23 The interviews followed the pursuer’s story about their experience which 
led them to make a claim, rather than trying to ascertain the ‘facts’ of their 
case. This approach is very different from that used in previous research, 
which has almost exclusively relied on questionnaires. Our approach provides 
qualitative data which allows for an in-depth exploration of themes that 
emerge from pursuers’ narratives, rather than being limited to testing pre-
decided hypotheses. Interviews allow the pursuers to tell ‘their story’. For 
many of the pursuers interviewed, their main motivation for pursuing a claim 
was that they had not felt listened to by medical professionals. The use of 
open-ended questions allowed pursuers to give voice to their experiences, 
and we did not want to further disempower pursuers by using pre-set 
questions. The interviews covered some difficult emotional issues, and we 
were conscious that it was important to take a sensitive approach.  
 
2.24 Our recruitment method relied on pursuers replying to our information 
sheets and consent forms. They had possibly gone through very traumatic 
experiences and we assumed that no response meant that they did not want 
to be interviewed. Although response rates increase with the number of efforts 
to obtain consent (Dillman 1978), we felt that follow up reminders were 
insensitive. This has undoubtedly produced a biased sample. It is quite 
possible that we have accessed people who are particularly motivated to 
speak to researchers, meaning that we have spoken to pursuers who felt 
invalidated by the process and sought recognition by someone ‘official’ 
listening to their story. There was a strong divide between the views of 
pursuers who received compensation (expressing strong satisfaction with 
both the process and outcome), and those that did not receive any 
compensation (much more dissatisfied with every aspect of their claim).  
 
2.25 Only five of the thirty pursuers whom we interviewed had received 
compensation (three for minor injuries where the insurer admitted liability 
immediately and settled quickly, two were very long, drawn out claims 
involving serious injuries, none went to proof). Twenty pursuer interviewees 
were women.  Although they were contacted via firms located in Glasgow and 
Edinburgh there was a geographical spread. Pursuers fell into two broad 
categories: those who suffered from injuries that they felt were serious and 
had a major impact upon their lives and those who pursued a claim after their 
spouse or child had died following a medical procedure.  
 
2.26 We conducted interviews and/or focus group sessions with 42 other 
stakeholders including pursuer solicitors, representatives from defender 
groups, patient support and advice groups, representatives of medical 
practitioner interests groups, Independent Advice and Support Service (IASS) 
advisors, NHS staff involved in resolving complaints, patient liaison, legal 
services and financial managers, medical practitioners including practitioners 
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from midwifery, general surgery, accident and emergency, obstetrics, and 
critical care. We conducted a mix of face-to-face and telephone interviews 
and focus groups.  Participants came from across a number of the Health 
Boards.  
 
2.27 Claims analysis was conducted on data provided by the CLO concerning 
closed files. This data has the potential to provide the general sweep that our 
pursuer interviews cannot capture. However it must be recognised that the 
data supplied to us by CLO has been collected for case monitoring purposes 
and not specifically for the research which we were undertaking. Thus it does 
not necessarily capture all of the characteristics of individual claims which 
would be useful. However, it provides for a much more nuanced survey of the 
topography of medical negligence claiming in Scotland than can be provided 
by aggregate data on claims settled. This data set contains information on 
many thousands of claims dating back to the 1980s.  Because the early data 
in this file is deemed less reliable than the more recent data we will only 
analyse data from the more recent past in Chapter 3. 
 
2.28 The CLO data set provides information at the level of an individual claim. 
Previous analysis of medical negligence claims data in Scotland (Ross 2003) 
reports aggregate and average award and expenses data. However the 
distribution of awards is highly skewed, with a small number of very large 
awards distorting both the aggregate and average data. Furthermore, the high 
value claims are associated with particular areas of medicine which are not 
representative of all areas. The statistical analysis of the disaggregated CLO 
data allows account to be taken of the differences across medical specialisms 
in both claiming and settlement costs.  Previously published aggregate data 
for CLO costs (Ross, 2003) did not distinguish between the costs incurred in a 
given year for claims settled in that year and ongoing claims. It would be 
misleading to apportion all cost incurred in a year to closed claims.   The cost 
data on individual claims made available to us by CLO has allowed us to 
distinguish between the costs of settling small value claims (less than 
£20,000), the costs of all settled claims and the costs to the public purse of 
unsettled but closed claims. 
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CHAPTER 2: RESULTS OF THE STUDY OF PRESENT SYSTEM 
 
3.1 This chapter provides an analysis of the results of our research on the 
present negligence based system. It follows the structure of claiming as 
described by Mulcahy and Tritter (1998), who conceive patients’ 
dissatisfaction with medical care as a pyramid with medical negligence claims 
as the tip and all patients who receive medical treatment at the base.  The 
next level up from the base consists of patients who make a complaint.  
Overall, the proportion of patients who make a complaint is very small.  The 
majority of people who make a complaint do not make a claim.  A medical 
negligence scheme must be understood in terms of the way a dissatisfied 
patient moves up the pyramid.  
 
3.2 Some of the desired objectives for a new Scottish scheme are linked to 
the parties directly involved, such as providing compensation that is 
acceptable to the patient and their family. Other objectives are concerned with 
the wider picture, such as organisational, local and national learning; patient 
safety; and quality improvement. These wider objectives may not be 
achievable by a medical negligence scheme alone.  It is important that a new 
scheme is tied into the entire process by which patients attempt to resolve 
disputes. Any changes to each level within the pyramid are likely to have 
effects in the other levels, and so the interconnections need to be considered. 
 
Adverse events  
 
3.3 The base of our pyramid consists of patients who have been the victim 
of an adverse event. One of the expressed aims of a new scheme is to 
improve patient safety, and this implies reducing the number of adverse 
events. There is no data concerning the incidence of adverse events involving 
personal injury in Scotland, although research across the UK suggest that 
10% of hospitalisations result in adverse events with half being preventable 
(Vincent et al. 2001).  Audits of specific areas of medical speciality in Scotland 
and morbidity reports suggest that the frequency of adverse events in 
Scotland is similar to England and Wales (Crawford 1991, Christie 2003). 
 
3.5 Interviews with stakeholders suggested that the current system achieves 
some of requirements of institutional learning and reporting of errors. There 
was evidence that some practitioners were prepared to be open about errors. 
For instance, several pursuers explained that they had been encouraged to 
see a solicitor after the doctor who performed the surgery told them that they 
had made a mistake, and that the patient should sue. These pursuers also 
described the steps the surgeon took in trying to remedy the error, such as 
referring to a new surgeon and following up with the patient to check that they 
had received ongoing medical care. All of these pursuers had met with the 
surgeon who was responsible for the error, had received an explanation of 
what had happened; and an apology. Medical practitioners and NHS 
managers also described how adverse events are reported and then 
explained to patients, and NHS staff mostly appeared satisfied that a system 
of reporting was in place which ensured lessons were being learnt. 
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Interviewees explained that the NHS was a much more ‘open culture’ now 
relative to five years ago.  
 
3.6 However, all of the NHS staff interviewed acknowledged that problems 
persist and identified a number of barriers to reporting of errors, including 
being worried about the threat of litigation, feeling a sense of professional 
shame or embarrassment and being fearful that an error may harm 
professional reputation. Most explained that medical records are not always 
complete, and one NHS manager suggested that medical records are 
sometimes changed retrospectively without the changes being recorded. 
Although several NHS managers claimed to have achieved an open culture, 
they expressed surprise that a medical practitioner would encourage a patient 
to sue.  
 
3.7 Interviewees from within the NHS explained that individual clinical teams 
and departments were concerned that lessons were learnt from errors. They 
explained that team meetings were arranged regularly and that any patterns 
or reoccurring errors were picked up and dealt with seriously. However, there 
seemed to be less opportunity to learn from errors occurring across Health 
Boards. Several interviewees explained that they received reports about 
patterns of errors.  However, they also explained that little attention is 
generally paid to these which were seen to get lost among the many other 
reports and correspondence received by clinical staff.  Increasing 
administrative load was also seen to decrease the amount of time available to 
spend on reading adverse events reports.  
 
3.8 Interviewees including NHS staff, medical practitioner representative 
bodies and MDS did not feel that compulsory reporting would make much 
difference. They described reporting as not necessarily being ideal, but that 
continuing cultural change would alleviate problems rather than stricter 
regulation.  
 
3.9 Studdert and Brennan (2001), based on the relative openness of 
Swedish medical practitioners to report errors and encourage patients to 
make a claim, suggest that no-fault schemes are better than fault-based 
schemes at reducing adverse events.  In a review of all admissions to 13 
large hospitals in New Zealand in 1998, Davis et al. (2003) found that the 
reporting of errors was “remarkably high.” They argued that these results 
suggest that no-fault schemes do not encourage medical practitioners to be 
afraid of litigation. Yet, in New Zealand the percentage of adverse events is 
similar to fault-based jurisdictions, including the UK (Davis et al. 2002, 2003).  
  
3.10 The New Zealand scheme has been criticised for failing to provide 
institutional learning or deterrents for medical practitioners to avoid error. The 
goals of institutional learning and tracking of errors are not explicitly within the 
remit of a compensation scheme. They would need to be built in as additional 
features. Our research suggests that fear of litigation is only one of the 
barriers to reporting errors. Other research suggests that the main reason for 
not reporting errors is being unaware of how errors should be reported. Other 
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reasons include fear of reprisals, and lack of confidentiality and time (Jeffe et 
al. 2004, Garbutt 2007, Kaldjian et al. 2008).  
 
3.12 NHS interviewees pointed to higher staff to patient ratios, greater 
availability of consultants, greater focus on intern training and supervision 
relative to England, as being important in ensuring that patients do not feel 
aggrieved. While there appears to have been improvement in post-operative 
care, our research suggests that there is still room for progress. Several 
interviewees stressed that the level of one-on-one care that patients receive 
pre-operatively does not necessarily carry over into post-operative care.  Staff 
ratios drop and consultants become less available. Patients’ perceptions of 
this difference can lead to dissatisfaction, which if left unaddressed could 
potentially lead to a negligence claim.  
 
3.13  Several pursuers also felt that there was a connection between 
resourcing and adverse events. These pursuers felt that an error had 
occurred as medical staff were being required to make decisions based on 
resourcing rather than medical needs; elderly or working class patients, were 
given lower standards of care; some also felt that patients who were 
overweight, alcoholic, smoked, or had a chronic illness were given sub-
standard care; some explained that they had intimated a claim in order to 
highlight how the NHS was letting down ‘the wee people’, (people who were 
seen to be less deserving of care).  
 
3.14 All interviewees working within the NHS, as well as patient support and 
advice groups, expressed concern about future decreases in resources. Most 
felt that further cutbacks will reduce standards of care, which will in turn 
increase the incidence of adverse events. Expectations of any new scheme 
need to be realistic. A scheme alone cannot achieve better institutional 
learning, reporting or reducing adverse events. These objectives are much 
broader, and require other measures also being put into place.  
 
Patient grievances 
 
3.15 Pursuers’ narratives of what had gone wrong with their medical care 
were invariably complicated involving multiple overlapping concerns about 
medical care, general care, communication, staff attitudes, staffing levels, and 
resourcing.  
 
3.16 Concerning medical care, pursuers’ main concern focused on the failure 
of medical staff to take the patient’s problem seriously.  They were not 
listened to when they tried to convince medical staff that the problem was 
more serious. For some, the injury would not have occurred if medical 
professionals had done more tests, paid more attention to stated symptoms, 
or read the medical notes properly. For others delay was the problem. If 
medical professionals had acted sooner, the injury would not have occurred. 
Once the serious state of their (or their relative’s) medical condition became 
known, the medical staff ‘denied’ that the delay or lack of diagnosis had been 
a problem. In a few instances, pursuers felt that the medical staff were 
unaware that an error had occurred, however, ‘They should have known’. 
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3.17 Problems with general care, in particular, the lack of hygiene had led to 
infections.  Several also complained that relatives were not being fed in the 
hospital, patients were left to self-medicate, and other basic needs were not 
being attended to.  Medical staff were seen as inattentive, dismissive of family 
concerns, and failed to treat patients with sufficient care.  
 
3.18 Most pursuers also felt that the injury was caused, at least in part, by 
poor communication on behalf of the medical staff. All said that they had tried 
to raise their concerns with medical professionals, but their concerns were not 
listened to. Some felt that staff lacked empathy and compassion, were 
‘bullying’ or arrogant, and as a result failed to pay attention when the patient 
had tried to communicate that their problem was serious. Pursuers explained 
how a doctor or nurse did not fully listen to their concern and jumped to a 
preconceived idea or conclusion of what the problem was and how to treat it. 
 
3.19 For some pursuers, consent had been forced by a medical professional 
who refused to listen to the patient’s concerns particularly given the patient’s 
emotional state.  Pursuers felt that the doctor involved should have been 
aware that the patient was afraid, desperately ill and in a vulnerable position. 
For others, consent had been sought from the patient, who was not capable of 
providing consent and instead the family should have been more involved.  
 
3.20 Discontent about the exclusion of family members from medical 
decisions was a recurring theme, especially if the patient had died. Family 
members recalled being denied access to the patient’s medical notes, not 
being informed of what was going on, and not being treated compassionately. 
Some of these problems had occurred during treatment but some continued 
after the patient had died. One pursuer described how she had been 
promised a post-mortem which she felt would have provided insight into why 
her husband had died.  The post-mortem did not occur. Another had to take 
the NHS to court to have her husband buried in the cemetery of her choice.  
 
3.21 Further recurring themes were: insufficient staffing levels; lack of 
availability of consultants; and under-resourcing of the NHS (resulting in some 
groups of patients receiving a lower standard of care than others). Some 
pursuers felt that medical care had been left to nurses or junior doctors, who 
did not have the skills to recognise the seriousness of their problems. They 
stated that consultants were not sufficiently available, or refused to listen, 
were arrogant, did not examine the patient adequately or were uninterested. 
 
3.22 Our research suggests that patient dissatisfaction is an outcome of 
multiple factors.  Pursuers felt that the combination of poor communication, 
staff attitude to listening to patients, lack of availability of consultants, as well 
as failure to diagnose, resulted in a medical injury.  An accumulation of 
problems led to a sense of disempowerment. 
 
3.23 Similarly, previous research has suggested that patients do not sue 
simply because they have been injured.  Complaints frequently focus on 
communication, attitudes, general problems and waiting times, not on issues 
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of treatment, tests, diagnosis and surgery (Allsop 1994, Mulcahy and Tritter 
1998). A patient may be injured by a serious adverse event but not take legal 
action. Another who has suffered a minor problem or has not been injured 
may make a claim (Studdert et al. 2006). A large number of researchers have 
suggested that communication breakdown between doctors and patients may 
lead to litigation (Adamson et al. 1989, Daniel et al. 1999, Hickson 2002, 
Huycke and Huycke 1994, Lester and Smith 1993, Levinson et al. 1997, 
Lloyd-Bostock and Mulcahy 1994, Penchasky and Macnee 1994, Press 1984, 
Shapiro et al. 1989, Vincent et al. 1994). Our findings are similar.  
 
3.24 NHS staff interviewed largely concurred that communication breakdown, 
family members feeling excluded, and the lower availability of consultants 
post-operatively were the main reasons behind patient dissatisfaction. Several 
described patients as often being reluctant to speak up directly if they are 
unhappy, and instead practitioners need to be more attuned to indirect signs, 
such as a patient becoming withdrawn. They also described that some 
practitioners simply did not have strong patient listening skills, and that 
despite efforts to take a more patient-centred approach, problems with poor 
communication have not decreased. They explained that while it may be well-
known within a hospital that some consultants were more likely to receive 
complaints relating to attitude and communication, it was unfair to give these 
practitioners less patients. It was felt that little could be done to improve these 
problems as they are largely due to consultants’ individual personalities.  
 
3.25 These findings point towards ways to potentially decrease patient 
dissatisfaction, which are not necessarily tied to the implementation of a new 
scheme. Most grievances are associated with communication breakdown, and 
while this appears to be well known, it appears that little headway is being 
made. The focus of medical practitioners on clinical aspects of care, and the 
belief that problems cannot be alleviated due to individual personalities act 
against improving practitioner-patient relationships. A new scheme would not 
address these problems, and it seems that these issues need to be 
addressed institutionally and before the patient makes a complaint.  
 
3.26 In addition, our findings suggest that pursuers cannot easily make a 
distinction between communication and general care problems, and instances 
involving a negligent clinical error. The growing complexity of issues being 
raised suggests that a new scheme will receive a mix of problems, and 
pursuers cannot be relied upon to isolate the issues involved. There will need 
to be a screening and investigation process to sort out claims where a clinical 
error has occurred. It is possible that many claims will not contain a serious 
clinical error, yet the pursuer will want their problems acknowledged, and 
possibly, to receive compensation. To dismiss poor communication as not 
being of serious concern may risk some pursuers continuing to be 
dissatisfied. 
 
Complaints 
 
3.27 The complaints procedure in Scotland provides a single, simple route for 
making a complaint against any NHS service. Complaints can be made in any 
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format, including raising a concern in person, via email, or in writing. There is 
a strong emphasis on local resolution, with the expectation that investigation 
and resolution will be completed within 20 days. Complaints managers 
explained that within this timeframe, they needed to obtain medical records, 
talk to the staff involved, and write to the patient. Patients who are dissatisfied 
with the outcome of their complaint can then proceed to the Ombudsman. The 
complaints procedure is intended to provide patients with an investigation, 
explanation, and where appropriate an apology; however, it does not provide 
financial compensation. 
 
3.28 The number of complaints in Scotland has remained relatively stable in 
recent years (Table 1). In 2008/09, a total of 10,967 complaints were 
recorded.  Of these 6904 were made against hospitals and community 
services the bulk of which (4921) were made against acute services.   A total 
of 3175 complaints were made against family health services, the bulk of 
which were made against GPs. Over half of the complaints related to staff 
attitude/behaviour and 29% concerned treatment, which again reflects the 
importance of improving communication in order to avoid patient grievances. 
Of these complaints, 29% of complaints were upheld, 33% partly held, and 
39% not upheld. 
 
Table 1: Number of medical complaints since 2006 
 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 
Complaints 11,230 11,144 10,967 7,123 
Ombudsman 632 599 684 859 
(Note: changes to the logging of complaints to the Ombudsman were made in April 2007. The 
2006/07 figures have been adjusted. However, adjustments cannot be made for data collected prior to 
2006). 
 
3.29 The large majority of pursuers interviewed had used the complaints 
procedure. Of those that did not, the injury was clear and the doctor involved 
admitted immediately to the pursuer that there was a problem. In one case, 
the doctor encouraged the pursuer to see a solicitor. In another instance, the 
pursuer described that the Clinical Director arranged a meeting in order to 
avoid “lots of letters”, and promised to get back to the pursuer following an 
investigation. When the patient did not hear anything further, they contacted a 
solicitor.  
 
3.30 Pursuers appeared to be knowledgeable about the complaints 
procedure, and the main source of dissatisfaction consisted of the failure to 
provide a ‘real’ explanation rather than the process. The main complaint about 
the process was that it lacked independence. For many of the pursuers, the 
investigation of complaints about medical professionals by the NHS 
represented a ‘cover up.’ Some had received explanations and apologies, but 
felt that these were simply platitudes intended to prevent pursuers asking 
further questions. There were some other problems with the process, for 
instance, the Clinical Director who did not take forward the promised 
investigation (above). Another pursuer explained that she had not received a 
reply to her complaint despite her efforts at following up.  
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3.31 Our results suggest that, for the most part, the process of filing a 
complaint is accessible; however this finding may be an outcome of our 
research method. We only interviewed people who pursued a claim, and 
pursuers described themselves as being determined and resilient. We did not 
speak to people who attempted to negotiate the complaints procedure or 
make a claim, but gave up. In addition, pursuers tended to focus on the 
narrative of the problems they had experienced with their (relative’s) medical 
care. The process of trying to resolve their claim, including the use of the 
complaints procedure, did not seem to be so central to pursuers. 
 
3.32 There is some other evidence that Scottish patients are satisfied with the 
complaints process, at least relative to patients in England. Despite only one 
third of complaints being fully upheld, only a very small proportion of 
complaints are made to the Ombudsman in Scotland. In 2009/10 the Scottish 
Ombudsman received 859 health related complaints, of which only 20 (2.3%) 
related to the way in which the initial complaint had been handled. In contrast, 
in 2007/08, 20% of complaints made to the Ombudsman in England related to 
poor handling of the initial complaint. In England, the complaints procedure 
has been criticised for being too complex and lengthy, and patients have 
experienced lost complaints, long delays, and feel that healthcare staff are not 
open about errors. One survey found that 30% of complainants felt that the 
complaints procedure was pointless (The Patients Association 2008). 
 
3.33 This is not to say the Scottish procedure could not be improved. Older 
research conducted by McCrindle and Jones (1998) describe the complaints 
procedure as being too complex, not being user friendly, taking too long to 
make decisions, producing defensive responses and failing to give 
satisfactory explanations. More recent research recommended better training 
for staff involved in handing complaints, that information about making 
complaints was made more accessible, and that there was a greater provision 
of face-to-face and telephone contact rather than such a heavy reliance of 
written communication (The Expert Group on Financial and Other Support 
2003:33). Since these findings, however, the complaints procedures have 
been changed. In addition, it has been suggested that complainants are not 
always satisfied with the explanation that they are given, do not always 
receive an apology, or feel that they were listened to (Britain et al. 2009).  
 
3.34 Britain et al.’s (2009) recent evaluation of the complaints procedures in 
Scotland also showed that there was a heavy reliance on written material and 
written communication. NHS staff in Scotland reported that the increasingly 
complex nature of complaints made the 20 day limit difficult and that 
complaints managers were feeling overwhelmed by relatively trivial 
complaints. We were also told by NHS staff that complaints were becoming 
increasingly complicated and multi-faceted. They explained that the process 
of investigating was often difficult to complete within 20 days, especially if 
medical records had to be located across different sites, medical notes were 
not complete, or the staff involved were on leave. It was suggested that 
patients would possibly prefer that complaints were investigated thoroughly 
rather than replies provided within 20 days. Incomplete responses may leave 
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patients feeling that the Health Board is being evasive or is supporting a 
‘cover up’.  
 
3.35 Our research found that the strongest critics of the complaints 
procedures tended to be NHS staff who were directly involved in handling 
complaints. Several criticisms of the ways in which complaints were dealt with 
were given: medical staff sometimes react defensively; a suggestion that 
medical reports are occasionally changed retrospectively; replies to their 
inquiries are often written using complex medical jargon; and while 
explanations may be given, the response is not always written empathetically 
or shows that the patients’ concerns were listened to. Nevertheless, NHS staff 
felt that very few complaints were not resolved at the local level, and that even 
if a patient felt that there may have been negligence, the explanation of what 
had actually happened was usually accepted by patients.  
 
3.36 Patient support and advice groups also identified several problems: 
complaints can take a long time to be dealt with; the NHS can be defensive, 
even aggressive, towards patients who complain; and the process is 
intimidating, especially for people who are vulnerable. It was argued that the 
types of complaints patients usually raised such as poor communication, were 
related to issues not recorded in medical records and that the complaints 
system is not geared towards recognising these issues. Likewise, a survey of 
patient dissatisfaction in Ayrshire and Arran found that most criticisms focused 
on staff being too busy, not being helpful, not understanding admission 
procedures, and poor ‘hotel’ services such as meals (Ayrshire and Arran 
Health Board 1993). Our interviews suggested that NHS staff may dismiss 
many of these concerns as being ‘trivial’ and instead only see serious 
concerns about clinical treatment as ‘real’ complaints. 
 
3.37 The main problem with the complaints procedure does not appear to be 
the process of complaining, but patients’ reluctant to use the process. A 
number of studies in Scotland have highlighted that disgruntled patients tend 
to take no action. For instance, a survey of NHS Scotland patients in 1992 
showed that while only 3% of patients felt the need to complain, only a third of 
these patients actually did so. Patients did not know whom to complain to, 
they felt that complaining would make no difference, were fearful of 
retribution, and felt in awe of medical professionals (HMSO 1992). Dissatisfied 
patients may be reluctant to act out of concern that they will damage their 
relationship with the doctor (Pleasence et al. 2003), especially if there are no 
alternative providers (Annandale and Hunt 1998) or patients are concerned 
that services may be denied (Mori 1997).  
 
3.38 Most stakeholder interviewees felt that the concern about damaging the 
relationship with the doctor and fear of being unable to find an alternative 
healthcare provider remain.  However patients are increasingly challenging 
medical professional dominance. They explained that the social hierarchy has 
started to change and patients are more aware of their rights. This can 
potentially be seen in the changing nature of complaints. According to 
stakeholders, complaints in the past focused more on a single clinical event, 
but were now more complicated with general care and poor communication 
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increasingly being challenged. They also described patients’ letters as having 
greater sophistication and that patients often will have done considerable 
research on the internet before making a complaint. 
 
Supporting patients through the complaints process 
 
3.39 The majority of pursuers received support from their family or friends to 
make a complaint and then a claim. One of the problems with the complaints 
process identified by support and advice groups is that patients are often too 
ill or feel too vulnerable to make a complaint. It would appear that the support 
of family and friends is very important in overcoming the power imbalance 
between patients and the medical profession. The involvement of family 
members in the medical complaints process has also been noted by other 
researchers. Several previous studies have suggested that relatives may feel 
more dissatisfied than the actual patient (Allsop 1994, Annandale and Hunt 
1998:125, Lloyd-Bostock and Mulcahy 1994, Mulcahy et al. 1996).  
 
3.40 Several pursuers also stated that they received support from a number 
of different sources, including Scotland Patients Association (SPA), 
Independent Advice and Support Service (IASS) and Action Against Medical 
Accidents (AvMA). They explained that they received help in writing letters.  
For several pursuers who did not have strong literacy skills, this support was 
seen to be invaluable. Pursuers also explained that support groups had 
assisted in asking the ‘right questions.’ The importance of support and advice 
groups in providing this assistance was reflected in the interviews with NHS 
staff, several of whom stated that the letters written by complainants had 
become increasingly sophisticated (as stated above). They suspected that 
patients who wrote letters which were focused and asked specific questions 
had received support from a knowledgeable family member or patient support 
or advice group. 
 
3.41 Not all complaint letters, however, appear to have been written by 
people with knowledge of the complaints procedure. Several NHS 
interviewees stated that it was often very difficult to work out what a 
complainant wanted and that some letters expressed a vague ‘concern.’ 
Some pursuers did not receive any help, and it is these pursuers that seemed 
to struggle to raise their concerns in a clear manner. For instance, one 
pursuer had sued after her husband had died, and the legal claim hinged on 
delayed diagnosis. Once the pursuer’s husband was diagnosed he underwent 
urgent and major surgery, during which he suffered a serious injury. The 
pursuer explained that she understood that the surgery had been high-risk 
and that the surgeon had been unlucky rather than careless. However, her 
complaint focused on the surgery and she did not ask any questions about the 
missed diagnosis. She felt that she should have asked more questions about 
this aspect of the claim, but did not realise its significance.  
 
3.42 The complaints procedure requires patients to be provided with an 
information leaflet which encourages them to seek assistance from a support 
or advice group. Pursuers, however, appeared to have found these groups 
somewhat by chance, rather than having followed the leaflet’s advice. For 
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instance, they had walked past an advice or support group while in the 
hospital, and one walked past an office while shopping in a mall. Others found 
support while searching the internet. While NHS staff could clearly discuss the 
process of dealing with complaints in terms of what actions they needed to 
take, no-one raised the need of ensuring that the patient was also supported 
through this process. They said that patients were directed to the leaflet on 
the NHS website, but no-one stated that they encouraged patients to seek 
support.  We understand that standard acknowledgements to complaints 
included advice on the Independent Advice and Support Service established 
in 2006 but feel that more could be done to ensure that patients seek support.  
 
3.43 This also raises the issue of how potential pursuers are to be informed of 
any new scheme, and how advice and support groups are to be tied into the 
process. At the moment, the leaflet seems to have little benefit. The process 
of complaining appears to work because it is simple and involves multiple 
pathways (email, verbal, written complaint). Patients, however, do not appear 
to be locating additional material themselves, and so there will need to be a 
significant education programme to make patients aware of any changes. 
 
Medical negligence claims 
 
Relationship between complaints process and claiming 
 
3.44 Figure 1 shows the number of closed claims in the CLO data according 
to calendar years.  It should be noted that the year in which the case is 
‘closed’ in this data set is the year in which the claim record was marked as 
‘closed’. This may differ from the year in which the case settled or when the 
award was paid. 
 
Figure 1: Number of claims received since 
1992
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3.45 The CLO data reveals that the number of claims rose during the 1990s 
but there has been a declining trend since 1999.  This is illustrated in  
Figure 1. 
 
3.46 A few pursuers described the complaints procedure as a mandatory 
procedure that must be completed prior to making a legal claim. For several, 
this procedure was described as a hurdle that needed to be ‘jumped over’ 
before they could see a solicitor. They felt that the NHS would never admit 
what had really happened and that their complaint would not be listened to, 
and so making a legal claim was ‘inevitable’. This is not actually the case, and 
pursuers are entitled to make a legal claim without first having made a 
complaint. It seemed that some pursuers had been given confusing advice 
from advice or support groups, and that their expectations that the NHS would 
refuse to be open about adverse events were given validation.  
 
3.47 In Scotland, complaints and legal claims cannot be run at the same time, 
although this has recently changed in England and Wales. Pursuer solicitors 
explained that they may send a patient pursuer back to the complaints 
process in order to get an explanation and that this may suffice. Several NHS 
staff disputed the usefulness of sending a potential pursuer back to the 
complaints procedure, explaining that once someone has decided that they 
want to make a legal claim they become focused on obtaining financial 
compensation.  
 
 
Barriers to claiming 
 
3.48 Our sample is limited to people who have made a legal claim, and 
therefore were proactive in pursuing their rights. However, very few patients, 
including patients who have expressed a grievance or gone through the 
formal complaints procedure make a legal claim (Annadale and Hunt 1998). It 
may be that this is the case because the complaints procedure satisfies most 
disgruntled patients and they are happy with the explanation that they 
received. On the other hand, some patients may not continue with a claim 
because of barriers to access to justice such as lack of resources, 
information, or support.  
 
3.49 While the number of adverse events is relatively high in the UK, as well 
as other jurisdictions (Vincent et al. 2001), the proportion of claims remains 
very small. This suggests that patients may be reluctant to make a claim. We 
are unable to provide direct evidence concerning barriers to claiming. 
However, previous research highlights some potential problems. Following 
concern about the increasing failure of people to seek legal remedies for 
‘justiciable’ problems (problems with a potential legal solution), Genn and 
Paterson (2001) conducted a survey in Scotland to investigate what types of 
legal problems people face and their efforts at reaching resolution. Although 
the researchers did not analyse data specifically concerning medical 
negligence, they did find that a relatively high proportion (a third) of people 
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who experienced other types of personal injury requiring medical treatment 
did nothing. In fact, people who had experienced a potentially justiciable 
personal injury were less likely to take action relative to any other type of 
justiciable problem. A follow up study by the Legal Services Research Centre 
suggests that people who felt that they had suffered from a medical 
negligence event were significantly less likely to take action relative to other 
types of problems, except for issues relating to mental health (Pleasence et 
al. 2006, Pleasence et al. 2003). The main reasons for the lack of action were 
the injury was minor or the other side had already taken action.   
 
3.50 Genn and Paterson’s (2001) research followed an earlier survey in 
England and Wales which used the same research instruments as Genn 
(1999). There were some differences between findings reported in Scotland 
and those in England and Wales. The Scottish respondents were more likely 
to pursue self-help remedies compared to people living in England and Wales, 
who were more likely to do nothing. Scottish respondents were also 
marginally less likely to seek legal help, which may reflect their tendency to try 
and resolve problems without assistance. Genn and Paterson (2001) also 
suggest that Scottish people were also less likely to report having 
experienced a justiciable problem, rather than there being a lower incidence 
rate.  
 
3.51 Pleasence et al. (2003), however, argue that the nature of legal 
problems is likely to be significantly different in Scotland relative to England 
and Wales. They suggest that social and demographic differences, including 
Scotland’s lower population density, greater number of people living in local 
authority housing and/or in flats, lower personal income and divorce rate, and 
small minority ethnic population are all likely to impact upon the types of 
justiciable problems experienced in Scotland relative to England, as well as 
reporting rates. Their results, however, show that people who are 
economically inactive, on benefits, and live in the rented sector or in flats, are 
more likely to experience justiciable problems. This would suggest that 
Scottish people are more likely to experience problems, and that the 
difference between Scotland and England is most likely attributable to a 
reluctance to report.  
 
3.52 Potential reasons for the failure to pursue a claim include believing that 
there was not a dispute, the other side was right (Genn 1999), nothing could 
be done, there was no-one to blame, the other side had already taken action, 
and fear of a defensive response or retribution (Mulcahy and Tritter 1998, 
Pleasence et al. 2003). Patients are also less likely to sue if they do not know 
a medical error has occurred, and if they cannot locate or pay for legal 
representation (Baker 2005, Weiler 1991).  
 
3.53 It would appear that some of the reasons for not making a claim would 
persist regardless of the nature of the medical negligence scheme, including 
potential pursuers not knowing that an error has occurred. However, if a 
scheme was introduced that lifted the potential barrier of finding legal 
representation, and which was aimed at providing compensation for lower 
level claims, then it could be expected that some of the people currently 
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deterred would make claims. In addition, if improvements in the way in which 
errors were reported and disclosed were also introduced, then a further 
increase in claims would also be expected.   
 
Pursuers’ motivations 
 
3.54 Previous research suggests that when an error has occurred, patients 
expect doctors to make an apology, provide an explanation and take steps to 
prevent the error from recurring (Allsop 1994, Hickson 2002, Hickson et al. 
1992, May and Stengel 1990, Mazor et al. 2004, McCord et al. 2002, Vincent 
et al. 1994, Witman et al. 1996) To a much lesser extent, injured patients 
wanted financial compensation (Mulcahy et al. 1996, Shapiro et al. 1989, 
Genn and Lloyd-Bostock 1995), and compensation is usually discussed in the 
context of fulfilling a particular need (Genn and Lloyd-Bostock 1995). Our 
results are broadly similar to previous studies.  However, there has been little 
in-depth consideration of what pursuer’s really mean by an explanation, 
prevention of future errors, apology or compensation. In addition, our results 
suggest that one of the most important motivations for pursuers’ is the desire 
to have their perception of what had caused the medical injury validated.  The 
significance of validation has not been noted in other research.   
 
Pursuers want their perceptions validated 
 
3.55 The main motivation for pursuers appeared to be the desire for validation 
of what they believed had happened, which they described as being ‘the truth’ 
or ‘the real explanation’. These pursuers explained that they had uncovered 
the real explanation only after thinking through the events carefully 
afterwards, gradually realising that there were important points at which errors 
had occurred. They had initially overlooked these ‘contributory factors’, but in 
hindsight had come to understand their ‘real’ significance. For others, the ‘real 
explanation’ had been suggested by another doctor, a friend or relative with 
medical expertise, or they had researched the medical condition on the 
internet. Some felt that the real explanation was just ‘commonsense’, 
especially as there was such a stark contrast between their (or their family 
member’s) healthy state and their eventual state after the alleged error had 
occurred.  
 
3.56 These pursuers strongly rejected any efforts at an explanation which did 
not tally with their ‘truth’. They felt that medical professionals were a ‘closed 
shop’ who denied the truth, and that medical staff were ‘telling lies’. Solicitors 
who did not validate this truth were described as being ‘disinterested’ or even 
‘corrupt’, and medical experts who provided different accounts were seen to 
‘lack independence’ and to have sided with their medical colleagues. While 
the pursuer solicitors felt that it was possible to locate appropriate 
independent medical experts in Scotland, some pursuers considered that it 
was impossible to obtain independent advice in a small jurisdiction. They cited 
problems with medical experts turning the case down due to former 
connections with either the hospital or the doctor who was alleged to have 
caused the injury. In all of these claims where pursuers were critical of the 
medical experts, the claim was withdrawn after the medical expert on behalf 
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of the purser agent found that there had not been negligence. For pursuers, it 
was blatantly obvious that negligence had occurred.  However, no-one was 
prepared to listen to their views. Even some pursuers, who had obtained 
compensation and seemed very satisfied with most aspects of their claim, still 
stated that they had not received an adequate explanation. 
 
3.57 Pursuers also appear to cling to opinions that provided any validation, 
even if the confirmation was only slight, of this ‘real’ explanation. They 
described doctors who had suggested that an error had occurred as being 
‘fantastic’, ‘understanding’ and ‘prepared to listen’. One pursuer described a 
response from the Ombudsman stating that she understood the pursuer’s 
‘disquiet’, as suggesting that her views may finally be listened to. Several 
found validation from support or advice groups.  
 
Need for an explanation 
 
3.58 The majority of pursuers explained that their main motivation for 
pursuing a claim was the desire for an explanation of what had gone wrong. 
The only pursuers who did not stress this as their main motivation were the 
few who had been told from the outset that an error had occurred, and were 
provided immediately with an explanation and apology. The majority of 
pursuers had gone through the complaints procedures, and several had also 
had their claims heard by the Ombudsman. They explained that they had 
used these processes in an effort to gain an explanation.  
 
3.59 Pursuers’ desire for an explanation appears to be linked to the desire to 
receive validation of their perceptions of what had happened. While pursuers 
explained that they had received a response to their complaint, they felt that 
this response had failed to answer their questions. For many pursuers, it does 
not appear that there was a lack of explanation per se, instead they appear to 
be dissatisfied with the explanation that was given, and felt that there must be 
a more accurate explanation which the NHS refused to provide.   
 
Desire to protect future patients 
 
3.60 Pursuers explained that while it was too late to improve their own 
medical condition, they were motivated by a desire to help others and ensure 
that medical errors did not occur in the future. For most pursuers, however, in 
order to do this, they felt that the real explanation had to come to light. For a 
few pursuers, the desire to produce change seemed to focus on an individual 
medical professional, although no pursuer stated that they wanted a doctor to 
be dismissed or prevented from practicing.  
 
3.61 For most pursuers, the best way to ensure that future patients were 
protected was to bring about systemic change. They wanted medical 
professionals to pay more attention to the views of patients and to take more 
care. Pursuers described themselves as “ordinary people” and “wee people”, 
who were up against a powerful and impersonal system, and they wanted an 
acknowledgment of their importance.  
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3.62 For several pursuers, systemic change was also related to the need to 
ensure that the NHS was appropriately resourced. Although we had spoken 
only to people who had made a claim against the NHS, pursuers also tended 
to be very supportive of the NHS. Several stated that they no longer had trust 
in doctors or hospitals, and that they had felt angry and let down. However, 
they still felt that the NHS was an essential institution, and that change should 
also consist of providing more resources to the NHS. None of the pursuers 
could recall being told of any actual changes that had occurred as a result of 
their claim.  
 
Need for an apology 
 
3.63 Previous research finds that injured patients want an apology which is 
not simply a matter of saying ‘sorry’, but is sincere and formal (i.e. in a written 
format), that is accompanied by an explanation and that the medical 
professional accepts responsibility (Hickson 2002, Hickson et al. 1992, Mazor 
et al. 2004, May and Stengel 1990, McCord et al. 2002, Vincent et al. 1994, 
Witman et al. 1996). If these expectations are not met then patients may feel 
even more aggrieved (Cohen 2004).  
 
3.64 The pursuers that we have spoken to, however, did not focus on wanting 
an apology as one of the prime motivations. Some of the few pursuers who 
had received financial compensation felt that an apology and explanation 
should have been offered.  However, most pursuers did not focus on the 
provision of apologies. It may be that as pursuers had already gone through 
the complaints procedure, some had received an apology. Pursuers recalled 
receiving an apology in writing from the Health Board or specific medical 
professional involved. Some recalled receiving an apology in person at the 
time of the injury, as well as during a later face-to-face meeting. Some 
seemed to believe that the apology was sincere; however, they were not 
satisfied with the accompanying explanation. They explained that they did not 
want an apology so much as ‘answers.’  
 
Desire for financial compensation 
 
3.65 Most pursuers strongly denied that they wanted compensation and 
instead were adamant that the only outcome they wanted was an explanation, 
although not all took this view. A few, explained that while they initially had 
complained in order to obtain an explanation, after their questions were not 
answered they had started to focus on trying to gain financial compensation. 
For these pursuers, the most powerful means by which the NHS could be 
forced to ‘change its attitude’ and ‘listen to patients’ was for the Health Board 
to risk losing money. For others, compensation seemed to take on symbolic 
value, with compensation representing an acknowledgment that the pursuer 
(or a relative) had suffered. These pursuers described themselves as being 
very traumatised by the medical error, and they felt that their distress should 
be recognised. 
 
3.66 A few pursuers had also clearly suffered financial loss following the 
medical injury, and these pursuers explained that they needed the money to 
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cover expenses. In one case, these expenses were significant, and while the 
case had taken over a decade to resolve, there had been no provision of 
interim support. In several instances, the pursuer had lost their job as a result 
of the injury, and so needed financial compensation for economic support. 
The pursuers who suffered some form of economic loss seemed to appreciate 
that compensation provided support to assist the pursuer back to a pre-injured 
state. Others, however, did not appear to appreciate the nature of 
compensation, for instance, one pursuer described her settlement as “a 
windfall”. 
 
3.67 The relative lack of focus on compensation needs to be treated with 
caution as these comments may well be tempered with a social desirability 
bias. It may be socially undesirable to admit to being primarily motivated by 
the desire to obtain financial compensation.  It is impossible to know with 
complete certainty what motivates pursuers. Several pursuers explained that 
they did not want to be seen as the type of person who pursues claims for 
money or would go to a solicitor who was only interested in obtaining a 
financial outcome.  
 
3.68 Notably, stakeholder interviews and focus groups suggest that social 
actors with direct contact with pursuers, such as solicitors and support groups, 
do not believe that the desire for financial compensation is the primary 
motivation for most pursuers. They argued that a desire for an explanation 
and an assurance that future problems will be prevented are the prime 
motivations, although most felt financial compensation may still play a role. In 
contrast, medical professionals and defenders were more likely to believe that 
pursuers’ primary motivation was compensation.  
 
3.69 Our finding that medical professionals and patient/patient rights groups 
have divergent views concerning pursuers’ motivations is replicated in other 
research. For instance, Ennis and Vincent (1994) show that doctors’ perceive 
vindictiveness to be the main motivation for clinical malpractice claims. A 
survey of New Zealand doctors showed that only 11% of respondents felt that 
patients’ complaints were warranted, and just under a third felt that 
complainants were not ‘normal’ people (Cunningham 2004b). Cunningham 
(2004b) argues that these perceptions act as a barrier to institutional learning.  
 
3.70 It may be that the difference between pursuers’ and doctors’ perceptions 
can be partly explained by the ways in which medical professionals 
experience complaints and legal claims. Previous research has shown that 
medical professionals find the experience of being sued to be very stressful. 
They experience a sense of betrayal and anger, and do not understand why a 
patient that they have tried to help has turned against them. To be accused of 
making a serious mistake leads to a sense of humiliation and medical 
professionals are fearful of recriminations (Cunningham, 2004a, Charles et al. 
1984, 1985, 1988, Martin et al. 1991, Saberi et al. 2009, Shapiro et al. 1989, 
Ennis and Grudzinskas 1993, Ennis and Vincent 1994, Rosenblatt et al. 
1990). Doctors’ emotional reactions to claims may increase adversarialism. In 
a survey of doctors who had been sued, Peeples et al. (2000) found that over 
half of the respondents responded to being sued with a desire for vindication. 
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Whereas solicitors saw the benefits of settling a case, doctors resisted efforts 
at resolution outside of court as this implied fault. This point was also raised in 
interviews with several medical defence organisations, who explained that 
earlier resolution can be hampered by defendants’ desire for vindication or 
concern that settlement implies fault.  
 
3.71 In our interviews, medical professionals explained that a patient may be 
harmed out of carelessness, but a doctor would never harm a patient out of 
malevolence, and that it was perplexing that a patient could not understand 
this. They explained that patients did not understand the stress caused by a 
complaint. Several pursuers also described incidences where the doctor 
alleged to have caused the injury had tried to express their emotions to the 
pursuer.  However pursuers felt that this was inappropriate. These pursuers 
felt that the doctor was only concerned about their own emotional reaction, 
and was not willing to listen to what they had to say. Thus, it seems that 
narrative conflict lies at the heart of a medical complaint or negligence claims. 
It appears that each side wants the other side to understand what has 
happened to them.  However, neither side is prepared to listen.  
 
Funding for claims 
 
3.72 Funding sources for pursuers’ claims were quite varied, with the bulk of 
pursuers receiving a grant of legal aid, some had legal protection insurance, 
and several paid privately. No pursuers had been accepted on a speculative 
fee arrangement. For the pursuers who paid privately, the costs were of a 
major concern, and most felt that the solicitors’ fees and the costs of the 
medical expert reports were too high. One felt that their initial solicitor had not 
been upfront about fees and changed to a specialist solicitor whose fee 
schedule was made transparent. All of the other pursuers explained that 
solicitors had made them aware of the costs from the first meeting in which 
some solicitors indicated ways to keep the costs lower. For some pursuers, 
the focus on funding suggested that the solicitor was primarily interested in 
obtaining fees.  
 
3.73 Pursuer solicitors explained that the main source of funding was legal 
protection insurance and legal aid, although not all of the specialists accept 
legal aid cases. They also explained that the outlays allowed by the Scottish 
Legal Aid Board (such as the costs of medical expert reports) were more 
generous once a claim had been established; however, they received much 
less for initial investigation work. They explained that medical negligence work 
can accrue high disbursement costs in the form of medical expert reports and 
advocates’ fees, and that after these expenses are paid there is often very 
little left to pay the solicitor’s fees. Legal protection insurance does not return 
the entire award to the pursuer.  Solicitors felt that most pursuers would be 
satisfied to receive most of the award rather than nothing.  
 
3.74 Several pursuers explained that they had wanted to avoid a ‘no-win no-
fee’ solicitor, as they felt that they and claims companies lacked medical 
negligence expertise and were primarily interested in obtaining high legal 
fees. They also felt that these firms would only aim to obtain financial 
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compensation, when they wanted an explanation of what had happened. The 
specialist pursuer solicitors explained that they did not take on cases on a 
speculative fee basis, although many potential clients expect them to. The 
limited size of firms and the smaller number of cases means that Scottish 
firms have not been able to draw on the same economies of scale as some 
large English firms. Kritzer (2001) argues that large-scale specialised firms in 
England have enough reserves to be able to take on high-risk and large, 
complex cases that would be beyond the resources of smaller, more 
generalised firms. In the UK, the losing party is liable for the other party’s 
costs, and this has added to the risk of running speculative fee cases. 
Scottish firms lack sufficient resources to be able to bear these risks.    
 
3.75 The pursuer solicitors explained that one of the largest barriers facing 
people who potentially have been the victim of medical negligence is finding a 
solicitor prepared to take on their case. The main reasons for a client being 
turned away was limited sources of funding and  a lack of solicitors prepared 
and able to take on medical negligence work in Scotland. This problem was 
reflected in the pursuer interviews, and several pursuers described difficulties 
in finding a solicitor to take on their case.   
 
Legal specialisation 
 
3.76 The routes used by pursuers to locate a solicitor were quite varied. 
Some were advised to contact a particular solicitor by an advice or support 
group.  These pursuers seemed aware of the benefits of having a specialist in 
the field. Others had family members who were solicitors; had researched 
specialists on the internet; contacted the Law Society; been directed to a 
particular solicitor by their insurance company; or had asked advice from work 
colleagues.  
 
3.77 The issue of speciality is important, as there are only six accredited 
pursuer specialists in Scotland. Accreditation is provided by the Law Society 
of Scotland.  Specialists involved in a focus group explained that there were 
several non-accredited solicitors who also could be defined as specialists. 
Nevertheless, this is a tiny proportion of solicitors practicing in Scotland, and 
all of these solicitors were based in either Glasgow or Edinburgh. The lack of 
specialisation reflects the relatively generalist nature of Scottish legal practice, 
and contrasts strongly with England and Wales (Kritzer 2001). Ross (2003:25-
27, 35-36) also found evidence that potential pursuers found it difficult to find 
legal representation, felt that the greater involvement of support and advice 
groups in Scotland may help to alleviate this problem and recommended that 
SLAB increase solicitor fees for medical negligence claims.  
 
3.78 The data provided to the research team by CLO includes the name of 
the firm of solicitors representing the pursuer.  Examination of this data 
reveals that the firms most frequently representing a medical negligence 
pursuer are not necessarily those containing an accredited specialist.  Firms 
with accredited specialists are ranked second, fourth, sixth, eighth and twenty-
second out of the 320 firms whose name is listed at least once in that period.  
The ten firms with the most cases account for 36% of the claims listed over 
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this period.  The firm with the most claims appears in 192 claims and the firm 
with the tenth largest number of claims has 30.  One hundred and sixty firms 
appear only once in the data base since 2004 and a further sixty-one firms 
only twice.  Thus 282 pursuers were represented by a firm who had 
represented two or fewer pursuers during this five year period. 
 
3.79 The database also enables us to examine the number of claims handled 
by firms over a longer period.  However, over a longer period movement of 
solicitors between firms and mergers of firms would render the data less 
reliable as a measure of ‘specialisation’.  In the analysis below when 
considering ‘specialisation’ we distinguish between the top five most 
frequently mentioned firms and firms outside the top five. 
 
3.80 A few pursuers had gone to a non-specialist beforehand, and most were 
clearly unhappy with the representation that they had initially received.  These 
pursuers lived outside Glasgow and Edinburgh, and explained that they had 
found it very difficult to find a solicitor to take on the case. This is in contrast to 
their views of the specialised firms they eventually selected. In one case, a 
pursuer used a ‘no win no fee’ firm and was pleased with the outcome—both 
in terms of the settlement and the information the pursuer solicitor obtained 
for the pursuer.   
 
3.81 Interviews with pursuer solicitors and medical defence organisations also 
highlighted that having a specialised solicitor has an impact upon outcomes. 
Pursuer solicitors explained that while the nature of medical negligence law 
itself may not necessarily require particular expertise, in that it follows the 
same principles of other areas of personal injury law, specialism is still 
important. Specialists are better able to find the most appropriate medical 
experts and advocates. They are also better at knowing when a claim will not 
succeed, at producing good settlements for their clients, and at selecting 
claims that need to proceed to court. Significantly, defenders explained that 
they are more likely to try to settle for a lower amount or to deny a claim if the 
pursuer is represented by a non-specialist.  The data supplied to the research 
team supports this view: a statistical analysis of claims closed from 1998 
reveals that the probability of a claim being repudiated is statistically 
significantly lower if the pursuer’s solicitor is one of the five firms with the 
highest number of claims during the period.  This result holds no matter what 
the medical speciality involved in the claim is. Defenders also know that the 
case will not be as well prepared, that the expert report for the pursuer may 
not be as strong, and that the solicitor will be more likely to fold under 
pressure. These views have support in previous research, which suggests 
that specialised solicitors obtain higher awards for their clients (Genn 1987). 
 
4.82 The CLO data has allowed the research team to examine whether there 
is any statistical relationship between the trajectory of a claim and the 
experience in medical negligence claiming of the firm representing the 
pursuer. We use the term ‘claim trajectory’ to cover a number of 
characteristics of closed claims.  No single characteristic can summarise the 
‘outcome’ of a claim.  The outcome has many dimensions.  Among those 
which we examined are: the reason the claim was closed; the length of time 
  34 
between a claim being received and it being closed; whether or not the claim 
was initially repudiated; and the total of payments made to the pursuer.  The 
statistical analysis undertaken is designed to identify characteristics of claims 
which appear to be associated with each dimension of a claim. We do not 
attempt to suggest that there is necessarily a causal connection between 
these characteristics and the dimensions of claim trajectories, merely a 
statistical association.  We would also stress that the characteristics which we 
have identified account for a very small proportion of variation in claim 
trajectories across all claims.  Nevertheless, the associations which we 
discuss below satisfy the normally accepted criteria for statistical reliability. 
 
4.83 The statistical analysis reported upon below uses panel data regression 
techniques (Wooldridge, 2000) to take account of any effect of the medical 
speciality to which the claim relates.  Consequently, the results reported 
below correct for any differences in claim trajectories associated with 
particular medical specialities.  However, there may be other characteristics of 
claims which affect the trajectory of a claim.  Thus we must examine the 
factors which are related to case trajectory in a multivariate context rather 
than a bivariate context. 
  
3.84 The statistical analysis we have carried out suggests that a claim is more 
likely to be closed because it has been settled if the solicitors’ firm 
representing the pursuer is one of the five most frequently used law firms. It is 
less likely to have been initially repudiated if the firm is one of the top five.  
The claim length (measured as the number of days between receipt of the 
claim and the claim being marked as closed) is higher if the firm is one of the 
top five.  However the claim being closed because of it being subject to a 
decree of ‘absolvitor’ or abandoned is likely to be higher if the firm is one of 
the top five.  There is no statistically significant relationship between the 
magnitude of total payments (award and expenses) and the firm being in the 
top five.  Whilst this result appears to be inconsistent with the evidence from 
our interviews, this is likely to be because the connection is indirect.  Total 
payments are higher in those claims which were not initially repudiated but the 
claim is less likely to be repudiated if the firm is one of the top five.3  Overall 
the statistical analysis would appear to be consistent with the subjective 
impressions of pursuers’ solicitors and defenders. 
 
3.85 Some pursuers clearly recalled that their solicitor had been initially 
careful not to build up the prospects for their case. They described how the 
                                               
3 The main types of claim outcomes are settled, absolvitor/abandoned and repudiated. Settled claims 
generally refer to claims where the pursuer received a payment for compensation, either as a negotiated 
settlement or as a court award. There were some instances where the pursuer did not actually receive 
any amount for damages, however, the defender agreed to pay for legal fees and/or disbursements. We 
also included these claims under the category of ‘settled’. Absolvitor are cases where the court has 
made a ruling in favour of the defender, and abandoned cases refer to those where the pursuer 
withdrew the claim or the defender ceased to receive any correspondence from the pursuer and/or their 
legal representative. We acknowledge that absolvitor and abandoned claims are different, however, 
they were coded together in the CLO closed claims database. Claims that are repudiated involve claims 
where the defender refuses to accept liability, although it is possible that the defender initially 
repudiates the claim but then later accepts liability.  
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solicitor had explained that there was no guarantee that they would receive 
compensation. Nevertheless, several pursuers who did not receive any 
compensation were still very disappointed that the solicitor had taken on their 
case.  Some felt that they had been ‘deceived.’  According to several 
pursuers, one area in which the pursuer solicitors indicated that they could 
help the pursuer was to get explanations for their case, and the failure to do 
so may be a reason for pursuers’ frustration. Others felt that their solicitor had 
not been honest with them from the very start. They explained that the 
pursuer solicitor had constantly promised that the pursuer would obtain 
compensation, whereas in the end, they received nothing. Some pursuers 
also felt that they had been promised ‘closure’, explanations, and apologies, 
but none of these outcomes were obtained. 
 
Initial investigation and disclosure of errors 
 
3.86 One of the main distinguishing features of medical negligence cases is 
the marked information asymmetry between pursuers and defendants (e.g. 
Bebcheuk 1984, Spier 1992). As a result, pursuer solicitors have to do 
considerable work upfront in order to assess whether an error had occurred, 
and then whether the error constitutes negligence. Many claims withdraw after 
this initial investigation.  
 
3.87 Pursuers generally felt certain that negligence had occurred, although 
most also explained that they had pursued a claim in order to find out what 
‘really’ occurred. Some pursuers discovered that an error had occurred 
because the medical practitioner concerned informed them immediately. 
Others discovered that something had gone wrong after talking to friends who 
had medical expertise. Most pursuers did not discover what had happened 
until they accessed the medical reports.  
 
3.88 Previous research has shown that one of the greatest barriers to making 
a complaint or a claim is not being aware a problem has occurred. Studies 
show that medical professionals may be supportive in theory of disclosing 
errors to patients, but are often reluctant to do so in practice. US studies 
suggest that less than a third of adverse errors are disclosed to patients and 
their families (Blendon et al. 2002, Soleymani Lehmann et al. 2005, 
Weissman et al. 2005, Wu et al. 1991)  This also appears to be the case in 
the UK (Schoen et al 2005). Medical professionals are more likely to disclose 
if the patient is in good health or needs further treatment and less likely if the 
error was preventable or not serious (Lopez et al. 2009, Schwappach and 
Koeck 2004). There is no duty of disclosure in any of the UK jurisdictions. This 
may mean that patients are unaware that an error has occurred.  
 
3.89 There are a number of possible reasons why medical professionals fail 
to disclose errors: fear of litigation (Berlin 1997, Chan et al. 2005, Gallagher et 
al. 2003); sense of shame; fear of loss of referrals and registration (Mazor et 
al. 2004, Wu et al. 1997); worry about threat to reputation (Shaw and Coles 
2001); uncertainty about how to report (Bateman et al. 1992, Belton et al. 
1995, Lawton and Parker 2002). A number of barriers to disclosure have been 
identified, including a medical culture of blame and punishment, assumptions 
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of perfection, code of silence (Andrews 2005). Doctors tend to see errors as 
unfortunate side effects (Schwappach and Koeck 2004), and when they do 
disclose, they choose their words carefully so that they do not explicitly admit 
that an error has taken place (Gallagher et al. 2006).  
  
3.90 Medical professionals’ reluctance to admit errors does not fit well with 
patients’ expectations.  Patients want doctors to acknowledge errors and 
accept responsibility (Hingorani et al. 1999, O’Connor 2010, Schwappach and 
Koeck 2004,), to be informed about all harmful errors, not just those that are 
obvious (Hingorani et al. 1999, Hobgood et al. 2002, Mazor et al. 2004).  
However, disclosure does not always prevent a claim from arising.  Research 
suggests that once a patient knows that a serious error has occurred, they are 
more likely to sue (Hobgood 2005, Mazor et al. 2004).  
 
3.91 Several pursuers had accessed their medical reports during the 
complaints procedure. Some had done so without any help, whereas several 
had received support from advice and support groups. One pursuer had even 
engaged an independent medical expert to review the medical reports. The 
main barrier to obtaining medical reports was cost, and as one pursuer 
explained, although the cost was only £70 she still struggled to find the 
money. Most pursuers, however, did not seem to consider that there were any 
problems obtaining medical reports at this stage. There were no reports of 
obstruction or delays. Pursuers and pursuer solicitors, however, reported 
difficulties obtaining medical reports once a claim had been intimated. These 
problems were described as one of the main sources of delay (see below).   
 
3.92 Some pursuers had obtained medical reports following advice from their 
solicitor. In some areas of law, solicitors will ‘unbundle’ the types of services 
that they can offer, and ask the clients to complete some, or part, of an aspect 
of the running of a case independently. Unbundling is largely done in an effort 
to reduce clients’ fees and usually only occurs if solicitors are confident that 
the client has the ability to cope with these tasks. There is little research on 
solicitors’ use of unbundled service.  Its use is controversial.  Some solicitors 
are concerned that they will lose control over a case or leave themselves 
open to negligence claims (Hunter et al. 2000).  Here, it appears that solicitors 
have unbundled the collection of medical reports, although the assessment of 
the reports was then handed over to the independent medical experts.  
 
Sources of Delay 
 
3.93 For pursuers, one main source of delay was in having to go through the 
complaints procedure prior to making a claim. As discussed above, several 
pursuers believed that it was mandatory to first make a complaint. Another 
delay for pursuers was waiting until they had the emotional energy to handle 
making a claim. Some explained that they had been too ill or traumatised to 
act immediately, and in some instances, the pursuer had wanted to wait until 
the patient died before taking action. Others waited in the hope that the doctor 
or hospital would respond to their initial inquiries and that this would resolve 
the problem itself. Pursuers described the process of claiming as being 
stressful.  For people who were already facing difficult circumstances or were 
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also grieving, making a claim added to their sense of trauma. In one instance, 
this delay meant that the pursuer had missed the limitation date. We did not 
speak to other pursuers where the limitation date was a problem.  Presumably 
this was because solicitors would be reluctant to take on the pursuer as a 
client if the limitation date had passed.  
 
3.94 While most claims seemed to settle relatively quickly, several claims 
involving large settlements, took quite a number of years to resolve. These 
claims were strongly contested and the pursuers did not receive any interim 
payments. This left the pursuers in very difficult financial situations.  While 
some ultimately won, they lost their jobs and, in one case, also their home. 
 
3.95 Claim length is one of the characteristics of what we have called above a 
claim’s trajectory. The CLO data on the time between a claim being received 
by CLO and it being closed is illustrated in figure 2. This shows that the mean 
(average) length of a claim on this definition rose over the first half of the 
period but has declined slightly thereafter.  The figure also shows the median 
for each year over the period. The median is the length of claim for which 50% 
of claims take longer and 50% less. When a distribution is skewed the median 
is a better measure of central tendency than the mean. As can be seen from 
the figure the average length of claim is much higher than the median. This 
indicates that some very long claim lengths are inflating the mean length. 
 
Figure 2: Length of Claim 
Length of Claim by Year Case Closed
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
d
ay
s 
fr
o
m
 R
ec
ei
p
 b
y 
C
L
O
 t
o
 C
lo
su
re
Mean Median Trendline for Mean Trendline for Median  
 
3.96 Figure 2 also illustrates that although the trend in the median over the 
period is similar to that of the mean the gap between the mean and the 
median has widened suggesting that over time the distorting effect of very 
large claims has increased. This is confirmed by examining the relationship 
between the median and the longest 5% (95th percentile) and 10% (90th 
percentile) of claims over time.  The ratio of the length of the claim at the 90th 
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percentile to the median in 2009 is greater than the ratio between the 95 th 
percentile and the mean in 1998. 
 
3.97 We have carried out statistical analysis of factors which appear to be 
related to case length (as defined above).  We used the panel data technique 
mentioned earlier to account for the influence of medical specialism.  The 
results indicate that claim length has increased over time, is lower if the claim 
was initially repudiated, is higher if a settlement was reached, increases with 
the ‘value of the claim’ and is higher if the firm acting for the pursuer is one of 
the five most frequently listed firms. However, we were not able to examine 
the influence of expert reports in this analysis. The ‘value of the claim’ is an 
artificially constructed variable since not all claims are initially lodged with a 
specific financial value attached to them. The ‘value’ used here is the higher 
of the value in the initial claim or CLO’s estimated value of the claim when 
lodged. 
 
3.98 All stakeholder groups explained that delay is often caused by problems 
in obtaining medical reports, e.g. due to medical staff being on leave, or 
records being missing. Several pursuers explained that their medical records 
were incomplete or missing.  This clearly led to the impression that the NHS 
was ‘covering up’ important information. In one instance, the pursuer 
explained that it had taken several years for the solicitor to obtain the medical 
report and when it was obtained the notes had been re-written. We were also 
told that the CLO tends to wait until claims accumulate and then they are 
progressed as a group. The CLO advises that this will only occur in ‘class 
actions’. While defenders were not seen to be overly litigious or to deny 
liability maliciously, it was stated that there are no incentives for the NHS 
Health Boards to take a more proactive approach. 
 
3.99 This problem may be related to the failure in Scotland to bring in reforms 
similar to the Woolf reforms in England and Wales, which introduced case 
management reforms in medical negligence claims. These set time limits by 
which parties needed to produce responses and progress claims, allow for 
offers to be made without the admission of liability (Part 36 offers) and ensure 
the exchange of expert reports. Admittedly, not all of the Woolf reforms have 
been a success, for instance, the use of mediation appears to still be minimal 
(Mulcahy 2001). On the other hand, defenders argued that the reforms are not 
necessary, as there is no incentive to delay a case once a decision 
concerning whether to accept or refute a claim has been made, settlements 
are often made without an admission of liability, roundtable discussions and 
other forms of informal dispute resolution are commonplace, and once the 
case has reached proof there are opportunities for the exchange of evidence.  
 
3.100 Case management reforms for medical negligence claims were also 
recommended by Ross (2003:32-39). This Expert Group suggested prior 
exchange of factual evidence.  It appears that this recommendation was not 
taken up. It was acknowledged that unnecessary delay and expense for 
straightforward claims had been resolved by the Coulsfield reforms, but that 
further case management reforms were needed to assist complex cases. In 
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addition, they also recommended that further research was needed into the 
advantages of mediation for medical negligence. 
 
Claim outcomes  
 
3.101 Only a small number of the pursuers we interviewed were satisfied with 
the outcome of their legal claim. This result may be, in part, an outcome of the 
methods we used to contact pursuers.  Research which relies on an opt-in 
response (which we have) is typically biased towards people who are 
dissatisfied. Only one of the pursuers received an explanation from the legal 
process with which they were satisfied. Whereas pursuers tended to receive 
an explanation, apology and assurances of change from the complaints 
procedure (even if they did not accept these outcomes), the legal process did 
not produce any such outcomes.  A few pursuers received financial 
compensation which was seen as inadequate in the absence of the other 
outcomes. 
 
3.102 Pursuers who received compensation were very happy with their legal 
representation, although some still expressed discontent with the outcome. 
Most described their solicitor as supportive, hard-working and thorough. 
However, pursuers who had their claims withdrawn tended to describe their 
solicitor as disinterested in the case and only interested in obtaining fees. 
Dissatisfied pursuers explained that they had wanted their solicitor to ‘fight’ 
their case, and were sure that negligence had occurred but the solicitor had 
refused to listen to their story. Some felt that their solicitor had not been 
honest, that they had failed to gather all the medical reports, and had dropped 
the case once the pursuer ran out of money. 
 
3.103 Dissatisfaction was also directed toward medical experts. For some 
pursuers, medical experts were not independent, but instead were engaged in 
order to provide support to their case. When this support was not forthcoming, 
they described the expert as having ‘sided’ with the defendants. As mentioned 
earlier in the report, two medical experts declined to review files because of 
their previous affiliation with the hospital or doctor.  Whilst this could be 
viewed as a medical expert being honest about a conflict of interest, pursuers 
viewed this as medical experts not being able to be neutral or honest. 
 
3.104 For pursuers who were deeply dissatisfied, there was a strong sense of 
powerlessness and lack of closure. Most had gone through the complaints 
process, and then the legal process, and at each stage had been told that 
their narrative of events did not match with that of the NHS. These pursuers 
insisted that negligence had ‘still’ occurred, but no-one was prepared to listen. 
The lack of closure also appeared to be strong in pursuers who felt that 
questions had still not been answered. They felt that there were answers 
‘somewhere’ but that they were inaccessible to them. Some pursuers 
explained that their solicitor had stated that their legal case would bring an 
explanation and therefore closure, when in fact this had not occurred. These 
pursuers said that they were ‘bitter’ and ‘angry’ about ‘everything’.  
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3.105 The outcome of the legal process was, for many pursuers, not the end 
of the impact that the injury had on their lives.  There appeared to be a lack of 
a sense of closure. Pursuers had lost their jobs, suffered from chronic pain, 
had their social lives curtailed, were no longer mobile, had lost their 
independence, or suffered from depression. One person committed suicide as 
a result of the impact of their injury. Some pursuers expressed a ‘niggling 
doubt’ that if they had acted differently, then the injury may have been 
prevented. Pursuers discussed how they wished that they had spoken up or 
been more assertive at the time of the adverse event. Some stated that they 
felt that they were partly to blame, especially if a family member had died.  
 
3.106 It appeared that pursuers’ ongoing problems were not well considered 
within the legal process. No pursuer whom we interviewed had received 
interim payments, or support to stay in employment, although several did 
receive physical rehabilitation. Many of the pursuers were obviously grieving 
and, especially for those who had lost a close relative, the death was 
described as being inexplicable. None of the pursuers described having been 
offered grief counselling, and there also appeared to be a lack of support from 
palliative care.   
 
3.107 As we have explained above claim outcomes are multi-dimensional.  
We have used the term ‘case trajectory’ to indicate this.  We have analysed 
the CLO data set to identify those case characteristics which are associated 
with the elements of a case’s trajectory.  . 
 
Table 2: Reason Claim Closed 
1998 - 2010 
Reason Number Percentage 
SETTLED 2166 34.3% 
ABSOLVITOR/ABANDONED 1164 18.4% 
REPUDIATION 994 15.7% 
TIME-BARRED 455 7.2% 
DISMISSED 154 2.4% 
OTHER 1388 22.0% 
of which:   
REFUSAL OF LEGAL AID 32 0.5% 
         NO INSTRUCTIONS 925 14.6% 
         OTHER 427 6.8% 
         GONE TO INSURERS 4 0.1% 
TOTAL 6321 100% 
 
3.108 Table 2 shows the number and percentage of each reason given in the 
CLO data set for a case being closed.  The table shows that just over one 
third of the claims closed since 1997 were settled.  We have examined the 
pattern of settled claims over time.  This is shown in Figure 3.  The trend over 
time is for a higher percentage of claims to be closed because they have 
settled, although there has been a slight decline in the most recent years. 
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Figure 3: Percentage of Closed Claims Settled, 1998 - 2009 
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3.109 We have looked at a number of factors which might be associated with 
the reason the case was closed.  These include the medical specialisation 
associated with the claim, whether the solicitors firm representing the pursuer 
was one of the five firms who appeared in the data base most frequently 
during this period, whether the claim was initially repudiated, the financial 
value of the claim and the length of the claim (measured as the time between 
receipt of the claim and the claim being closed).  We also took account of the 
calendar year in which the claim was closed.  As explained above, the ‘value 
of the claim’ is an artificially constructed variable since not all claims are 
initially lodged with a specific financial value attached to them.  The ‘value’ 
used here is the higher of the value in the initial claim or CLO’s estimated 
value of the claim at the time it was lodged.  There was sufficient information 
in the CLO data set to allow us to examine statistically the factors associated 
with the reason for closure for 5,734 claims closed over the period 1998 – 
2009. 
 
3.110 The probability of a claim being closed due to being settled: has 
increased over time; is lower if it was initially repudiated; is higher if the 
solicitors firm is one of the five most frequently mentioned; is higher the larger 
the ‘value of the claim’. It should be noted that the probability of the claim 
being initially repudiated has declined over time and is lower if the firm is one 
of the ‘top five’ firms. 
 
3.111 These results imply that after other relevant factors (including medical 
specialism) have been taken into account the higher the ‘value of a claim’ the 
more likely it is to end in settlement.  In other words, claims with a low implied 
financial value are less likely to result in settlement. 
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3.112 We have carried out a similar statistical analysis of the characteristics 
associated with the other reasons for closing a case.  For most of these this 
shows the obverse relationships from settled claims.  A major exception is for 
those claims which have been marked as closed because a decree of 
‘absolvitor’ has been granted or the case has been abandoned.  This has 
risen over time.  The probability of the claim being closed for this reason is 
higher if the firm is from the top five.  This is may be because a claim pursued 
by one of the top five firms is more likely to go to proof.   
 
3.113 When the analysis is carried out for all non-settled claims except for 
those granted a decree of ‘absolvitor’ or abandoned, the results are simply the 
obverse of those for settled claims. 
 
3.114 Overall this statistical analysis suggests that low ‘value’ claims are less 
likely to terminate with a settlement than those with high ‘values’.  The 
analysis also suggests that a settlement is more likely if the pursuer is 
represented by a ‘specialist’ medical negligence firm of solicitors.  It is also the 
case that these specialist firms are likely to be associated with high value 
claims.  However it should be noted that our statistical analysis cannot 
distinguish between cause and effect here.  It may be that a pursuer is more 
likely to choose a specialist firm if the claim is potentially of high value but it 
could also be that specialist firms are only willing to take on claims with high 
potential ‘value’. 
 
3.115 We have also examined whether there is a statistical association 
between the total payments made on a claim and various characteristics of 
the claim.  The results suggest that total payments: have risen over time; are 
lower if the claim was initially repudiated; is higher the longer the claim length; 
is higher the higher is the claim value.  There appears to be no direct effect of 
the pursuer being represented by one of the five most frequently listed firms.  
However, there is an indirect effect since the claim is less likely to have been 
repudiated if the firm is one of the five most frequently listed. 
 
3.116 The statistical analysis taken as a whole suggests that a claim’s 
trajectory is influenced by the ‘value of the claim’ and directly or indirectly by 
whether the firm representing the pursuer is experienced in medical 
negligence claiming.  One implication of this analysis is that claims with a 
relatively low ‘value’ may be better dealt with outside the delict system.  
However, our interviews with pursuers suggest that this may not resolve the 
narrative conflict which appears to be at the root of medical negligence 
claims. 
 
3.117 In the light of the statistical results which suggest that all other things 
being equal higher value claims are likely to result in settlement and in higher 
total payments being made we have looked at the differing trajectories of 
closed claims with either a value less than £20,000 or total payments less 
than that sum. 
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Figure 4: Low Valued Claims 
 
 
 
3.118 Figure 4 shows the percentage of all closed claims with a claim value 
of less than £20,000 together with the percentage of settled claims with a 
value of less than £20,000.  As can be seen in all but one year the proportion 
of settled claims with a claim value less than £20,000 was below that for 
closed claims as a whole suggesting that these low valued claims are less 
likely to settle. 
 
3.119 An examination of total payments (awards plus expenses) made on 
closed claims using the CLO data base shows that for every year over the 
period 1998 to 2009 50% of closed claims received no payment. A further 
25% of closed claims received payments of less than £10,000.  In the most 
recent years less than 18% of closed claims received total payments of 
£20,000 or more. 
 
Claim costs 
 
3.120 Data supplied by CLO to the research team has allowed us to examine 
not only the amount paid out as awards on settled claims but also to examine 
the costs in terms of CLO chargeable costs and outlays of achieving those 
settlements.  For settled claims we also have data on the cost of outlays 
awarded to successful pursuers or agreed by CLO.  We also have information 
on CLO chargeable costs and outlays for unsettled claims. 
 
3.121 Figure 5 shows the awards and costs of claims closed for each year 
from 1998 to 2009. It should be noted that the sums of money plotted in this 
figure do not necessarily correspond to actual CLO expenditure in these 
years. The year refers to the year the claim was closed by CLO. Awards and 
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adverse costs are quite likely to be paid out in that year but CLO expenditure 
on fees and outlays will have been incurred over the life of the claim. 
 
Figure 5: Total Awards and Costs of Closed Claims 
 
 
Figure 6: Total Awards and Number of Settled Claims 
 
3.122 It is clear from the figure that total awards and costs have risen more or 
less steadily over this period in absolute terms. The sums quoted, however, 
are in current prices and have not been adjusted for inflation. As Figure 3 has 
illustrated only around one third of closed claims in any year have been 
settled.  Figure 6 shows the total of awards and their number for settled 
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claims. Although the value of awards has risen by more than five fold over the 
period, the number of settled claims 2009 was only slightly above those at the 
beginning of the period.  This of course suggests that the average sum 
awarded has risen significantly over the period even after inflation has been 
taken into account. 
 
3.123 Earlier in this report we have shown that the claim trajectories of claims 
below £20,000 are somewhat different from those above that sum. Figure 7 
shows the average award and average costs associated with settled claims 
where the total award was less than £20,000. 
 
Figure 7: Average Award, Costs and Expenditure for Settled Claims with 
Award below £20,000 
 
 
3.124 The average award in these settled claims has fluctuated over the 
period and at the end of the period was slightly higher than at the beginning. 
However, the chargeable costs and outlays to the CLO have risen quite 
significantly as have the sums paid out in adverse costs.  Indeed the latter two 
items taken together are on average higher than the award.  This is illustrated 
in Figure 8.  In recent years costs have been much greater than the awards 
made for these low value awards. 
 
3.125 In addition to the costs of settled claims CLO incurs costs for 
chargeable costs and outlays in claims that are not settled. On some 
occasions CLO will make a payment to the pursuer for fees incurred by the 
pursuer even where the claim is not settled. The total of the costs for 
unsettled claims is shown in Figure 9. These costs have risen over the years 
from around £300,000 to over £1M. This analysis is unable to estimate the 
costs to pursuers of unsettled claims where the NHS Health Boards do not 
make a contribution. 
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Figure 8: Average Cost as a Percentage of Average Award for Awards 
Below £20,000 
All Costs as Percentage of Average Award:
Claims with Award < £20,000, Closed 1998-2009
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Figure 9: Costs of Unsettled Claims 
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3.126 This brief survey of costs indicates clearly that significant costs are 
incurred for unsettled claims and that the costs associated with small claims 
have been rising and currently are greater than the awards made. 
 
Potential impact of an alternative scheme 
 
3.127 Most pursuers felt that improvements to the current system must be 
made.  There was a clear preference from them for a ‘no-fault’ scheme, 
  47 
although the limits of such a scheme were obviously not appreciated. There 
was very little support from across most of the other stakeholders for an 
alternative scheme. 
 
3.128 Pursuers suggested that the NHS should listen more to the views of 
patients. Several emphasised the importance of doctors or the NHS following 
through with their communication with the patient.  They also felt that more 
should be done to ensure that patients (and their relatives) receive adequate 
explanations, apologies and compensation. Some pursuers who had received 
a negative medical report also expressed the need for an ‘independent’ 
expert, suggesting that all medical professionals regardless of their 
relationship with the NHS are involved in a ‘closed shop’. It seems that some 
pursuers will see experts from outside the NHS as being independent, but that 
was not the case for all pursuers. Some pursuers clearly felt that every 
avenue to dealing with a grievance, from making a complaint, going to the 
Ombudsman and then making a claim was too connected to the NHS.  
 
3.129 Almost all pursuers who did not obtain an award explained that their 
claims had failed because negligence is ‘too hard’ to prove. Most felt that an 
alternative scheme should lower the bar against which negligence should be 
proved. Many pursuers felt that they should have been entitled to some form 
of financial compensation, and wanted recognition that they suffered distress 
and that their lives had been adversely affected. They felt that a ‘better’ 
scheme would provide ‘fairer’ compensation, meaning that they would have 
received the compensation to which they felt they were entitled. Some were 
also clearly puzzled that they had received nothing, especially in claims where 
the doctor had admitted that they had made an error and had encouraged the 
patient to pursue a legal claim. For these pursuers, the doctor had ‘admitted 
liability’, and so they should be guaranteed financial compensation. It would 
appear that pursuers consider that a no-fault scheme would automatically 
entitle any patient who has suffered an injury to financial compensation. 
Pursuers were not able to make distinctions between liability and causation, 
or in lay terms, negligence and a medical error.  Having a medical 
professional admit liability was seen to be sufficient to show negligence. 
 
3.130 Our analysis of the CLO data on closed claims suggests that the vast 
majority of claims result in either no payments or only relatively small sums.  
Indeed, almost half of recently closed claims had an estimated claim value of 
less than £20,000.  The number of those which are closed without being 
settled suggests that payment of an average of £5,000 would increase annual 
expenditure by significantly less than £500,000.  However, our analysis is not 
able to estimate whether the number of such claims would rise. 
 
3.131 Most medical practitioners expressed concern about the potential costs 
of a scheme, worrying that resources could be diverted from front-end staff to 
cover a rise in claims. They acknowledged that the complaints mechanism 
was not perfect, but it offered timely resolution that satisfied the majority of 
patients. It was not clear to many interviewees how an alternative scheme 
would be different from the existing complaints system. There was a strong 
opinion that pursuers were primarily motivated by compensation, and that an 
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alternative scheme would encourage a ‘flood’ of financially-motivated claims. 
Most pursuers had intimated a claim as they felt that there had been a 
breakdown of communication, medical staff had been dismissive or arrogant, 
and general care had been poor.  They felt that these concerns were not 
addressed within the legal process. It is unlikely that these issues will be 
addressed by an alternative scheme.   
 
3.132 Practitioners and interest groups with direct experience of claims 
mostly felt that there were some advantages to the legal system. Some felt 
that solicitors helped pursuers take on realistic expectations, and would not 
push unmeritorious claims. Their removal would potentially limit the types of 
‘sensible’ advice being provided to pursuers. While interviewees may have 
acknowledged the potentially useful role of pursuer solicitors, most also 
considered the legal process to be adversarial, time-consuming and very 
rarely producing good outcomes for pursuers. Most interviewees felt that 
pursuers did not really want compensation, and those that wanted 
compensation were considered to be opportunistic and ‘greedy’. There was 
acknowledgement that some pursuers may have a genuine need for financial 
assistance, especially those where a baby had been brain damaged.  For the 
most part, defenders and practitioners seem sceptical about pursuer motives.  
 
3.133 It was felt by the majority of stakeholders that any effort to cap a 
scheme would be unacceptable to Scottish patients and would face strong 
resistance. There was strong opposition for a New Zealand style ‘no-fault’ 
scheme, in that it would set unrealistic expectations. There were also 
concerns about the lack of independent review, caps on awards, and the 
overall costs of the scheme. Almost all interviewees felt that any new scheme 
should add to patients’ rights, rather than limit their entitlements. There was 
also strong opposition to any scheme that would be expensive to implement 
and run. Concern was raised about implementation costs such as the need to 
educate complaints managers and other NHS staff, to link in with support and 
advice groups, and to raise awareness with patients and their families.  
 
3.134  One suggested alternative which appears to already be working in a 
rather ad hoc way is the reimbursement of costs incurred rather than 
compensation. Several IASS advisers and NHS managers stated that if a 
patient could show that they needed equipment or had directly incurred other 
expenses as a result of an injury, and that these costs were relatively low and 
‘reasonable’, the patient could receive reimbursement. Not all Boards were 
prepared to do this.  It appeared that claims were considered on an ad hoc, 
case-by-case basis.  The willingness of the Boards to reimburse was not 
formalised or advertised. This system does not provide pursuers with the 
additional independent investigation which they hope would give them the 
explanation not provided by the complaints procedures. Ross (2003:30) noted 
that NHS Boards had the power to make ex-gratia payments to complainants 
to cover relatively small losses, however, they expressed disappointment that 
such payments were rarely used.  
 
3.135 This is similar to the current system of reviews and panels in Wales  
Patients unsatisfied with efforts at local resolution made through the 
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complaints process can go to an independent review or panel made up of 
independent lay persons, who are informed by independent clinical assessors 
who are not members of the panel. The reviewer and the panel have the 
powers to award ‘modest’ financial compensation.  An unhappy patient can 
take a claim to the Ombudsman (or go directly to the Ombudsman). This 
system has not replaced the option of pursuing a legal claim. It was viewed 
favourably by several advice and support groups. 
 
3.136 This system has some features in common with the office of the Health 
and Disability Commissioner (HDC) in New Zealand.  The HDC resolves 
complaints by referring to the ACC, other appropriate agencies, or directly to 
the practitioner involved, calling for a mediation conference, conducting 
further research, or conducting a formal investigation. It draws on the services 
of independent advocates and an independent prosecutor (Farrell et al.,2010).  
 
3.137 These systems provide for greater independent investigation, and may 
assist people who would otherwise sue in order to get answers. They are able 
to provide a range of outcomes, including investigation, explanations, 
apologies, and financial compensation. In Scotland available outcomes differ 
between the complaints procedures and the legal system. The systems in 
Wales or New Zealand do not require proof of liability or causation. Therefore 
non-negligent events and patients’ non-clinical concerns can be addressed. In 
New Zealand, claimants have no right to legal redress.  In Wales, the legal 
route remains an option. There has been some criticism of the HDC.  
 
3.138 Ron Paterson, the former New Zealand Health and Disability 
Commissioner, has warned that: 
 
…emerging evidence shows that complaints are not necessarily the 
treasure trove that quality improvement gurus would have us believe. 
Instead of providing reconciliation and closure, complaints can have 
toxic effects on patients and doctors, and may perhaps more accurately 
be described as ‘toxic treasure’ (Paterson 2004:1). 
 
3.139 A 2001 review of the HDC complaints system shows that patients 
found the process to be confusing, cumbersome, difficult to access, and has 
high emotional and financial costs. A review in 2004 showed that 80% of 
providers were satisfied with the service compared to 46% of complainants, 
suggesting that HDC may be one-sided. There have been efforts to address 
some of these concerns: a single point of entry; greater capacity for 
mediation; greater flexibility to refer back to the provider for resolution 
(Paterson 2004). 
 
3.140 Support and advice groups in particular felt that the Working Group 
should not lose the opportunity to bring in radical change. However, calls for 
change from other stakeholders tended to be more modest. This group made 
suggestions such as: funding for legal claims needed to be improved; reforms 
akin to the Woolf reforms should be implemented; mandatory reporting of 
adverse events should be introduced as well as a duty of disclosure; and that 
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there be better mechanisms to collate data in order to ensure systemic 
learning.  
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CHAPTER 3: CONCLUSIONS 
 
4.1 Our research has examined medical negligence claims starting from the 
point at which a patient perceives that a problem has occurred, through to 
making a complaint and then pursuing a legal claim. Patient grievances 
appear to involve an often complex and overlapping mix of concerns about 
communication breakdown, poor staff attitudes, inadequate general care, and 
generally feeling disempowered. A grievance, and indeed a medical 
negligence claim, is not necessarily linked to a negligent clinical event, and 
many pursuers could not easily distinguish between negligence and poor 
service. Pursuers have invariably attempted to have their concerns listened to 
via the complaints procedures.  When this has failed they have sought legal 
redress.  A no-fault scheme will not necessarily address these non-clinical 
aspects of care, and this may leave some patients continuing to feel 
disgruntled. Nor will it necessarily decrease the rate of adverse events. The 
reporting of errors may be improved by removing the healthcare provider’s 
fear of facing litigation. Nevertheless, there are other barriers to the reporting 
of events.  The reduction of adverse events requires institutional learning.  
 
4.2 Our interviews with pursuers suggest that their major motivation is to 
gain recognition for their narrative around a medical ‘error’. In their view 
negligence is too difficult to prove. This suggests that much needs to be done 
to make clear the distinction between causation and liability. Our interviews 
with other stakeholders suggest a view that a ‘no-fault’ system might open the 
‘floodgates’. Others with direct experience of claims suggest that the current 
delict system means that pursuers’ solicitors are able to mediate the process 
through shaping pursuers’ expectations and screening out unmeritorious 
claims. There seems to be little if any support for capping any new scheme. 
 
4.3 Much of the discussion arising from our qualitative research has 
focussed on how improvements in the complaints system could give 
complainants a greater sense that they were being listened to and that steps 
would be taken to ensure individuals and institutions learned from their 
complaint. Our quantitative analysis has demonstrated that settlement of a 
claim is influenced by a range of factors including the experience of medical 
negligence claims of the pursuer’s solicitor and the financial value of the 
claim. Relatively small value claims appear less likely to result in settlement. 
This leads us to a view that small claims might be better dealt with in a 
development of the complaints system which permitted a moderate level of 
financial payment in some claims.  Data on costs supplied by CLO indicates 
that currently the costs of dealing with small claims which are settled, on 
average, exceed the awards made. This is a further factor suggesting that 
small value claims might be best dealt with by an alternative method. 
 
4.4 The Working Group has proposed the setting up of a ‘No-fault’ Scheme 
for medical injury.  In the Appendix to this Report we provide upper and lower 
estimates for the cost of such a scheme in a typical year over the recent past.  
We also provide a base-line estimate of the current negligence scheme’s 
costs for a typical year of £18,057,455.  Based on a range of plausible 
assumptions we estimate an upper and lower estimate for the proposed 
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scheme’s costs in a typical year.  The upper estimate is £27,014,275 and the 
lower estimate is £18,357,455. The proportionate increase in public 
expenditure represented by our upper estimate is considerably lower than that 
estimated for the introduction of a no-fault scheme in England. 
 
4.5  These wider objectives may not be achievable by a medical negligence 
scheme alone.  It is important that a new scheme is tied into the entire 
process by which patients attempt to resolve disputes.  
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APPENDIX: EXPENDITURE IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED 
NO-FAULT’ SCHEME 
 
Introduction 
 
A.1 The ‘No-Fault’ Working Group has recommended that there should be a 
move towards a ‘No-Fault’ System (NFS) broadly equivalent to the system 
which operates in Sweden. This appendix examines the possible expenditure 
implications of the Working Group’s proposals based on data provided by 
CLO.  
 
A.2 Any discussion of the expenditure implications of the proposed No-Fault 
Scheme has to be based on assumptions about how the proposed scheme 
will operate and how potential claimants will respond to it.  Different people 
will have genuine differences of opinion as to what are reasonable 
assumptions about how different potential claimants will respond to NFS.  In 
this report we will use two sets of assumptions to generate an upper and a 
lower estimate.   
 
A.3 We would stress that the estimates we produce below are not 
predictions about what the scheme will cost in the future but are estimates of 
what public expenditure would have been in a typical year over the recent 
past had the proposed NFS been in existence.  This allows us to use the 
information which is available on actual claims under the negligence based 
system to make judgements as to what would have happened had a No-Fault 
System been in place. 
 
Existing system baseline estimate 
 
A.4 The Working Group has proposed that consideration be given by the 
Scottish Government to a ‘no-fault’ scheme for medical injury along the lines 
of the Swedish model.  Nevertheless, it has proposed that compensation be 
based on need rather than a tariff.  We understand this to imply that 
compensation under the no-fault scheme will be broadly of the same 
magnitude as available in successful claims under the litigation system.  It has 
also been proposed that claimants who fail under the no-fault scheme should 
retain the right to litigate and that claimants who fail in litigation should have a 
residual right to claim under the no-fault scheme. 
 
A.5 Our approach to estimating the cost implications of introducing a no-
fault scheme follows our earlier approach of using the data supplied to the 
research team by CLO.  We use the data on closed claims produced in 
February 2010 to provide the costs of operating the current system and then 
estimate the likely cost of dealing with claims under the proposed system.  
This leads to an estimate of what expenditure would have been had the no-
fault scheme been operating in recent years.  This means that the expenditure 
patterns under the two systems can be based on realistic patterns of claims. 
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A.6 The Working Group has recommended that the proposed scheme be 
extended to all health care professionals in Scotland and not just those 
employed by NHS Scotland.  However, the estimates presented in this 
appendix refer only to health care professionals employed by NHS Scotland.  
This allows us to make a direct comparison of expenditure with that of the 
current system. 
 
A.7 We take the costs of the present system to be the costs associated 
with what CLO calls closed claims.  By costs we mean the cost in terms of 
public expenditure.  This expenditure includes the compensation awards paid 
to successful claimants, the payment of adverse costs and outlays to 
successful (and in some cases unsuccessful) claimants, chargeable costs of 
CLO staff time and CLO outlays and expenses.  Figure A1 illustrates the 
broad categories of expenditure for the years from 2004 to 2009. 
 
A.8 It should be noted that although the expenditures associated with 
settled claims have been rising over the period they have not risen as much 
as award levels and consequently have fallen as a percentage of award levels 
more or less continuously since 2004 (from 41% to 25%). 
 
Figure A1 
 
 
 
 
 
Awards and Expenditure on Closed Claims  
by year claim closed 2004 - 2009 
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Expenditure on Unsettled Claims  £ 754 , 701   £ 857 , 012   £ 1 , 033 , 768   £ 726 , 423   £ 1 , 257 , 540   £ 1 , 048 , 143  
Expenditure on settled Claims  £ 3 , 123 , 898   £ 4 , 249 , 877   £ 3 , 704 , 077   £ 3 , 095 , 409   £ 4 , 264 , 923   £ 6 , 123 , 187  
Total Awards  £ 7 , 704 , 399   £ 10 , 100 , 000  £ 11 , 300 , 000  £ 9 , 501 , 374   £ 15 , 200 , 000  £ 24 , 300 , 000  
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A.9 We have used claims closed in each year as the basis for calculating 
the expenditure involved in the present system.  However, there is a degree of 
arbitrariness on which year a case closes, particularly where a claim is of very 
high value and takes a long time to settle.  In order to account for this we 
average the figures illustrated over the period 2004 to 2009 to arrive at, as it 
were, what expenditure has been in a ‘typical’ year.  This figure is 
£18,057,455 and is treated as our baseline estimate for the current system. 
 
A.10 Readers are reminded that the estimates given in this appendix do not 
include the extension of the proposed scheme to private contractors to NHS 
(such as GPs, dentists and pharmacists).   
 
Generating estimates of expenditure under NFS 
 
A.11 In order to estimate the cost implications of the proposed scheme 
assumptions have to be made concerning a number of factors: 
 
1. What proportion of the claims which settle under litigation will settle 
under a no-fault scheme and what will be the average award? 
2. What will be the cost of reaching decisions under the new system? 
3. What proportion of claims that fail to settle under the litigation system 
will have an award made under a no-fault system? 
4. What level of awards will be made in those claims which settle under a 
no claims system but did not settle under the present system of 
litigation?  
5. How many additional claims will be made under a no-fault system 
compared to the litigation system? 
6. What proportion of these additional claims will receive an award? 
7. What will be the level of award for those additional claims that are 
successful? 
 
Assumptions 
 
A.12 To answer these questions we need to make some assumptions.  We 
now turn to these assumptions and their justification. 
 
Proportion of claims which settle under litigation settling under a no-
fault scheme  
 
Assumption 1a  
A.13 As mentioned in paragraph A.4, the Working Group has suggested that 
the choice of whether to seek compensation under NFS or under the 
negligence system should be left to the claimant.  Under the proposed NFS, 
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fault will still require to be shown but negligence will not.  Because of the 
difficulties, cost and risks of proving negligence we assume that all claims will 
begin in NFS.  Although the Working Group concluded that a claimant who is 
dissatisfied with an award or who is denied an award under NFS should have 
the right to claim for negligence, we take the view that it will not be rational for 
a claimant to do so since the burden of proof, costs and risks are greater and 
time taken to reach an outcome is much longer.  We thus assume for the 
purposes of our estimates that there is no leakage from the NFS to the 
negligence system. 
 
A.14 The Working Group also recommended that awards under NFS should 
not be based on a tariff and should be no lower than could be attained under 
the negligence system.  This implies that awards should not be reduced to 
reflect the reduced risks and delays in settlement under NFS as compared to 
the present system.  We believe that this further bolsters the case for 
assuming that there will be no leakage from NFS back into the court system. 
 
A.15 The implication of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs is that all 
cases which are settled under the present system will settle under NFS  
 
The assumed average level of award under NFS for claims which already 
settle under the current system 
 
A16  A judgement needs to be made as to what the average level of award 
for those claims which settled under the present negligence system would be 
had the NFS been in place.  This requires an interpretation of how the 
Working Group’s recommendations will work in practise. The Working Group 
took the view that awards should be based on need and that “therefore points 
to levels of compensation equivalent to those that would be awarded by a civil 
court.”  However, we have no data on what a court would award in a civil 
action arising from a medical injury which required that fault be proved but no 
proof of negligence was required because no such action exists in Scots Civil 
Law at present.  What the adjudicator under NFS has to do is, in the light of 
what is likely to be different evidence presented by the claimant and by the 
defender (and assuming fault to be proven) arrive at an award.  Under the 
Working Group’s recommendations the claimant has three potential courses 
of action: a) to accept the award; b) to sue for negligence; c) to appeal against 
the adjudicator’s award.  In deciding the magnitude of the award the 
adjudicator is likely to take account of options b) and c).   
 
A.17 Conceptually the adjudicator is in the same position as the CLO 
considering making an offer under the negligence system in the shadow of 
litigation.  We have concluded in A.13 above that those who settled under 
negligence would not choose to go down the negligence route when the 
option of a similar award was available under NFS.  Consequently, we take 
the view that on average an award equal to the award under negligence 
would be sufficient to dissuade the claimant from suing under negligence.  
What level of award would dissuade the claimant from mounting an appeal to 
the Sheriff Court or Court of Session as proposed by the Working Group as 
an appeal mechanism?  The attractiveness of an appeal to the claimant will 
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depend very much on the detail of the legislation implementing NFS.  It will 
also depend on the claimant’s attitude to risk.  In making a decision on 
whether to accept the defendant’s offer (or proceed to a court hearing) the 
claimant would be mindful of the risk that the case may not be successful at 
court and that he or she may have to pay legal (and other) costs if 
unsuccessful.  Experimental evidence shows that people are, in general, risk 
averse.  That is they will accept a sure thing (i.e. an offer) which is lower than 
the uncertain (probability-adjusted) expected value of the court award.  This 
risk implies that the pursuer would, on average, settle for less compensation 
than would be awarded by a judge should the case ultimately be successful in 
court.  As there would be no need to prove negligence but only fault (if the 
adjudicator rejected the claim) it is likely that a claimant would judge an 
appeal under NFS to be less risky.  This could raise the minimum (risk-
adjusted award) likely to dissuade a claimant from appealing against the 
award and consequently raise the award offer made by the adjudicator.  What 
this award would be on average will only be possible to estimate after awards 
have been made, accepted or rejected by claimants and decisions made on 
appeals.  It is possible that they could, on average, be the same as under 
negligence depending on how risk averse claimants are.  On the other hand 
levels of risk aversion among claimants may be such that they will require a 
higher award to dissuade them from appealing.  How much higher they would 
be is difficult to judge.  For every ten percentage points that awards are higher 
than the awards under negligence expenditure will increase by £1.3M 
 
Assumption 1b 
A.18 Our lower estimate of the average award made under NFS for claims 
that settled under the existing system is the average award under the existing 
system for this group of claims. 
 
Assumption 1c 
A.19 Our upper estimate of the average award made under NFS for claims 
that settled under the existing system is that they will be 20% higher than 
under the existing system 
 
 
Costs of setting claims under NFS 
Assumption 2 
A.20 The description of the Swedish system received by the WG makes no 
mention of any involvement of lawyers on either side when claims are being 
considered.  The administrative cost is stated to be £2,268 per claim.  Fenn et 
al (2004) used an administrative cost estimate of £2,000 per claim supplied by 
NHS for a Swedish no-fault system for England.  Fenn et al also assume a 
lower level of award under a no-fault system. On the other hand the WG’s 
report says that causation will still be an issue.  This seems to imply there will 
still be an adversarial element in determining causation.  For this reason we 
make the assumption that the costs of settling claims will on average be 
higher than in the Swedish system at £4,000.  This is around the average 
expenditure on unsettled claims in recent years.  We apply this cost to all 
claims under NFS.    Although under the current system a large proportion of 
legal claims are settled out of court, legal costs would still be incurred.  The 
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calculations assume that payments under a no-fault scheme will be of the 
same magnitude as those under the current litigation scheme.   
 
A.21 The consequence of this assumption on the costs of dealing with 
claims that would settle is shown in Figure A2.  This illustrates the very large 
savings which could result from a switch to ‘No Fault’.  Clearly to the extent 
that the actual expenditure in a ‘No-Fault’ system deviates from this sum the 
savings will change.  
 
A.22 This suggests that in a ‘typical year’ expenditure on these ‘settled’ 
cases under the proposed system would have been £710,667. 
 
 
Figure A2 
 
 
 
 
A.23 Assumptions 1 and 2 apply to all of the estimates which we make of 
expenditure under NFS. 
 
Claims which did not settle under present system 
Assumption 3 
A.24 We now turn to what we can assume will happen to claims that did not 
settle under the present system if they took place under NFS.  Under the 
Swedish system around 45% of claims succeed whilst under the current 
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Scottish system around one third of claims succeed.  If the success rate under 
the proposed ‘no-fault’ system were to be the same as in Sweden 25% of 
claims which do not settle under the present system would have to receive 
awards.  However, the number of claims per capita in the Swedish system is 
many times greater than under the present Scottish system.  There are a 
number of factors (e.g. claiming culture, litigiousness, acceptance of medical 
dominance) which may give rise to this difference but it is beyond the scope of 
the present project to explain differences across countries in making claims.  
Nevertheless, we believe it is reasonable to assume that among those claims 
which are made under the present system but which do not settle there is 
likely to be a higher proportion which would receive an award under the 
proposed NFS than the overall success rate in the Swedish system. 
 
A.25 We examined the implications of two possible success rates for such 
claims under NFS.   
 
Assumption 3a 
A.26 The first is that 40% of unsettled claims under negligence will succeed 
under NFS.  This would have the effect of raising the success rate of those 
claims which were made under the present Scottish system to 61% for a 
‘typical’ year under NFS.   This implies an increase in the success rate for the 
claims that are made under the present system of just over 73% (i.e. an 
increase from 35% to 61%). 
 
Assumption 3b 
A.27 The alternative assumption which we make is that the success rate for 
these claims under NFS should be treated as 60%.  This would raise the 
success rate for those claims which were made under the present system to 
74% for a typical year under NFS which implies it is 110% higher than under 
the present system (i.e. an increase from 35% to 74%).   
 
A.28 Both assumptions 3a and 3b result in a much higher success rate than 
in the Swedish system (45%).  This is because we assume that the claims 
which do exist under the current system will have more ‘merit’ than those in 
the Swedish system because they are derived from a system which imposes 
both a negligence and a causation test.  It is unlikely that a high proportion of 
claims made under the present system would fail the causation test although 
some will. 
 
Level of award for claims which did not settle under present system                                                                                                                
Assumption 4 
A.29 The empirical research reported in Chapter 3, indicates that, other 
things being equal, under the present system higher valued claims were more 
likely to settle than lower valued claims.  Further analysis of the CLO data 
makes clear that the average value of awards in any year is highly skewed, 
being dominated by a few very high value awards (over £1M) but also 
including a small number of high value awards (between £100,000 and £1M).   
This suggests that the average award under the present system is unlikely to 
be a reasonable estimate of the average award for claims which do not settle 
under the present system but are likely to settle under NFS.  It is also the 
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case that awards under the present system are very much lower than claim 
values.  Consequently the claim value of this category of claim is not a good 
estimate of what the value of award in this category of claim is likely to be 
under NFS.  Having examined in detail the CLO data we believe that 
reasonable estimate of the average award in this category is likely to be 
£20,000.  
Additional claims under NFS 
Assumption 5 
A.30 Under the proposed NFS for Scotland the number of claims for 
compensation is likely to rise.  The requirement to show only causation and 
not negligence is likely to lower the barriers to succeeding and the costs of 
making a claim.  Fenn et al (2004) conclude, on the basis of a large scale 
survey, that the introduction of a No-Fault system in England would be likely 
to increase the number of claims by 80%.  There is no comparable survey 
data for Scotland.  We take the view that such an increase is likely to be at the 
upper end of reasonable estimates.  Consequently we make our estimates of 
the number of additional claims under a Scottish NFS on the basis of two 
possible assumptions.   
 
Assumption 5a 
A.31 The first is that the increase is 20% of the existing claims in a typical 
year under the present system.  
 
Assumption 5b  
A.32 The alternative assumption which we make is that the increase is 80% 
as predicted for England. 
 
Success rate under NFS 
Assumption 6   
A.33 However, it should not be expected that all of these additional claims 
will succeed under NFS.  As mentioned in paragraph 4.21 only 45% of claims 
under the Swedish NFS succeed.  What is a reasonable estimate of the 
success rate under NFS in Scotland of the additional claims that will be made 
compared to the present system?  We have no real empirical basis for such 
an estimate.  Consequently, for the purpose of generating estimates we make 
two alternative assumptions. 
 
Assumption 6a 
A.34 Our lower assumption is that the success rate is 20%. 
 
Assumption 6b 
A.35 Our higher assumption is that the success rate is 60%.  
 
Average award for additional claims arising under NFS 
Assumption 7 
A.36 The final assumption that is needed relates to the average award that 
would be made to the additional claims arising under a Scottish NFS.  These 
additional claims arise because the implied cost of making a claim fall under a 
NFS system compared to a negligence-based system.  It seems reasonable 
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to assume therefore that these claims (which were discouraged under the 
negligence system) are likely to be of lower value than those that were made.  
Thus based on similar considerations to those discussed in paragraph A.26 
the average award made to these additional cases will be very much below 
the average award made under the present system.  However it is likely that 
this group will have an even lower value than those claims that are made but 
fail under the present system.  We, therefore, use an average award value of 
£16,000.  
 
A.37 It could be argued that the larger the number of additional claims the 
lower the average award would be.  This is plausible but not inevitable.  It 
should be noted that Assumption 7 is at variance with that made by Fenn et al 
(2004) in their study of England & Wales where they assume that the average 
award under an NFS will be 75% of the average award under negligence.  
Fenn et al (2004) did not have data on the size distribution of awards.  The 
CLO data provides that for Scotland and justifies a very much lower average 
award for these additional claims than under the present system. 
 
Estimates of expenditure 
 
A.38 The preceding paragraphs have produced eleven plausible 
assumptions which could be combined in various ways to generate alternative 
estimates of expenditure under the proposed NFS.  However, we believe that 
greater clarity will be gained if we combine the assumptions, all of which have 
some plausibility, in such a way as to produce a lower and an upper estimate 
of what expenditure would have been in a typical year under the proposed 
NFS system. 
 
A.39 The lower estimate is generated by combining Assumptions 1a,1b, 2, 
3a, 4, 5a, 6a, and 7.  The upper estimate combines Assumptions 1a, 1c, 2, 
3b, 4, 5b, 6b and 7.  Any other combinations of these assumptions will 
generate estimated expenditures which lie between these two combinations.  
Table A1 overleaf tabulates the expenditure under the existing system along 
with the lower and upper estimates. 
 
A.40 Expenditure in a typical year under the present system is estimated to 
be £18,057,455.  The lower estimate for NFS is £18,357,455 and the upper 
estimate is £27,014,275.   Both the upper and lower estimates involve very 
much lower cost of determining awards and of course obviate legal and other 
costs for both sides.  The lower estimate raises the number of successful 
claims by 85% compared to the current and successful claims represent 54% 
of all claims.  The upper estimate results in almost three and one half times 
more successful claims with an overall success rate of 68%.  It should be 
noted that under the Swedish system 45% of claims are successful. 
 
A.41 Estimates produced are not predictions of what a no-fault scheme will 
cost in the future but are estimates of what public expenditure would have 
been in a typical year over the recent past for cases handled by the Central 
Legal Office had the proposed no-fault scheme been in existence.   
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A.42 It is also the case that under the current system a large proportion of 
legal claims are settled out of court – no allowances are built into the figures 
to reflect this as it has been assumed that payments under a no-fault scheme 
would be of the same magnitude as successful claims under the current 
litigation system.   
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TABLE A1 
Estimates of Expenditure 
  
Awards on 
Claims 
settled 
under 
Present 
System 
Expenditure on 
Settled Claims  
Expenditure 
on Unsettled 
Claims 
Awards 
under NFS 
to 
previously 
unsettled 
claims 
Expenditure 
on 20% 
additional 
claims 
Expenditure 
on 80% 
additional 
claims 
Awards to 
additional 
claims 
Total 
Expenditure in 
Typical Year 
Present system £13,017,629 £4,093,562 £946,265         £18,057,455 
No Fault  - lower £13,017,629 £710,667 £1,302,000 £2,604,000 £402,533   £322,027 £18,358,856 
No Fault - upper £15,621,155 £710,667 £1,302,000 £3,906,000   £1,610,133 £3,864,320 £27,014,275 
 
         Notes: 
        1.  The estimates produced above are not predictions about what the scheme will cost in the future but are estimates of what 
public expenditure would have been in a typical year over the recent past for claims handled by the Central Legal Office had 
the proposed NFS been in existence.   
2. Paragraphs A.11 to A.39 explain and justify the use of the assumptions used to calculate the estimated costs.  The costs 
are based on a range and combination of assumptions involving consideration of the following factors: 
 The proportion of the claims which settle under litigation settling under a no-fault scheme; 
 Cost of settling claims under a No-fault system; 
 Proportion of claims that don’t settle under the litigation system that would receive award under a no-fault system; 
 Level of awards for claims which settle did not settle under present system; 
 Additional claims under a no-fault system; 
 Success rate of additional claims; and  
 Average award for additional claims.                                                                    
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